Chinese Stealth Goes Operational, Carrier Program and Export Initiatives Accelerate

By Tom Demerly

China Has Emerged as a Preeminent Global Strategic Super Power: What Does It Mean?

During the past five years China’s defense programs have not accelerated, they have increased by multiples into segments the Chinese had not previously been involved in. The introduction of a developmental aircraft carrier program, the fielding of an operational stealth fighter, the deployment of the world’s longest range ICBM and several new state-sponsored defense programs including tactical aircraft and helicopters intended specifically for export sale signal a parallel emergence of China’s global defense doctrine along with their dominant economic influence.

But what are China’s strategic and tactical air capabilities and, more importantly, what can we theorize about their intentions not only in Asia, but around the world?

China’s new defense and aerospace initiatives are a strategic necessity to provide foundational security for their rising economic influence globally.

Two years ago, in 2015 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranked China as the number one economic superpower in the world. That year China surpassed the United States based upon the purchasing power parity of GDP indicator (gross domestic product). The IMF reported that China produced 17% of the world gross domestic product in 2014 passing the U.S. GDP of 16%. China’s increased global influence has inspired low and middle income countries to emulate China’s approach. These Chinese allies now engage in partially state-sponsored rapid economic growth including the Latin American countries, Brazil, Argentina and Columbia as it emerges from a protracted drug war. India and Pakistan are now also aligned with China on several significant defense and economic initiatives.

While the subject of China’s emerging military is vast, there are several standout defense aerospace programs that provide an insight into China’s global motives.

China’s Operational Stealth Fighter: The J-20

China’s Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter has just officially entered active service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF): “China’s latest J-20 stealth fighter has been officially commissioned into military service, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Wu Qian told global media in a September 28, 2017 press release on the Xinhua.net and the official state defense media website.

Analysts suggest the J-20 is likely a medium-long range interceptor roughly analogous to the interceptor role of legacy aircraft like Russia’s older MiG-25 Foxbat, albeit much more sophisticated, and comparable to a Gen. 5 fighter.

There have also been comparisons to the U.S. F-22 Raptor, although the F-22 has emerged in combat in Syria as a precision strike low-observable aircraft in addition to its air superiority role. Western observers have suggested the primary low-observable capability of the J-20 is from the front of the aircraft, but perhaps not at other aspects, suggesting the J-20 is optimized for the interceptor role at least initially.

At different times, both in 2016 and 2017, there were unconfirmed reports that China may sell the J-20 to Pakistan in what would be the first-ever sale of a stealth air superiority specific Gen 5 aircraft in the export market (the multinational F-35 is described as a multirole Joint Strike Fighter, not exclusively as an air superiority interceptor like the J-20 or the U.S. F-22, which has not been exported outside the U.S.

Given this and more information about the J-20 it can be reasonably suggested that this aircraft is intended primarily for defense of Chinese air space and, if exported, some of its border allies. Sharing air defense with friendly border countries makes sense since China shares a border with a staggering 14 different countries. The U.S. only borders 2.

Read more at https://theaviationist.com/2017/10/25/chinese-stealth-goes-operational-carrier-program-and-export-initiatives-accelerate/#u24CMxrI7oU4G5A5.99

Oil Quality Issues Could Bankrupt Venezuela

By Nick Cunningham 

The next few weeks for Venezuela will be crucial, as it could struggle to meet a huge stack of debt payments. Reports that the nation’s oil production is experiencing deteriorating quality raises a new cause for concern for the crumbling South American nation.

Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA is reportedly shipping crude oil with growing quality issues. Reuters reported that its oil shipments are “soiled with high levels of water, salt or metals that can cause problems for refineries”. It’s a troubling situation for an oil company already suffering from a steep drop in output.

The quality problem is very much related to the country’s economic crisis. Without cash, PDVSA is struggling to obtain the proper chemicals to treat its oil, or pay for equipment and upkeep to maintain quality. As a result, PDVSA has had to shut down operations, or throttle back on production. “We’re refitting chemical injection points, recouping pumps and storage tanks,” one PDVSA worker told Reuters. “But without chemicals, we can’t do anything.”

The oil company has been shipping crude that is apparently causing problems for refiners around the world. According to Reuters, that has led to complaints and even cancellations of purchases. Phillips 66, a U.S. refiner, cancelled at least eight cargoes in the first half of the year due to inferior quality. It also demanded discounts for other shipments. Refiners in India and China have also lodged complaints.

The sales cancellation poses a serious financial threat to a company and country already wallowing in a horrific economic crisis. For example, the cancelled shipments were carrying oil representing $200 million in value, according to Reuters estimates. PDVSA is the only lifeline for the Venezuelan state, so reports that the one source of revenue keeping the country somewhat afloat is not only declining but is now exhibiting declining quality is alarming.

Output is falling, cash is drying up and oil workers have fled the country because of food shortages and violence.

The problem for PDVSA is compounded by the fact that a few months ago the Trump administration slapped sanctions on new financial arrangements with the oil company, prohibiting PDVSA from engaging with U.S. banks to restructure debt. The measures also add a new level of red tape for U.S. refiners who do business with PDVSA. Because of the new pressure from Washington, refiners are starting to look elsewhere for their crude. PBF Energy, the fifth largest U.S. refiner and regular PDVSA customer, has reportedly halted direct purchases from the Venezuelan oil company.

Read more at: Oilprice.com

The 5 Countries That Could Push Oil Prices Up

By Nick Cunningham - Oct 23, 2017,

Oil prices appear to be stuck in the $50s per barrel, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t serious supply risks to the market.

An unexpected disruption could occur at any moment, as has happened in the past, leading to a sudden and sharp jump in prices. Geopolitical tension has been largely irrelevant since the collapse of oil prices in 2014, but it’s making a return now that cracks have emerged in some key oil-producing nations. The threat of an outage will carry more weight as the oil market tightens.

"The 'Fragile Five' petrostates—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela—continue to see supply disruption potential, with northern Iraq crude exports at risk due to an escalation of tensions between the (Kurdistan Regional Government), Baghdad and Turkey, while the United States has decertified the 2015 Iran nuclear deal," U.S. bank Citi said.

Indeed, five prominent oil-producing nations are beset with challenges, for varying reasons, all of which could spring a surprise on the oil market without any advanced notice.

Iraq. The most near-term supply risk comes from Iraq. The surprise seizure of Kirkuk’s oil fields by the Iraqi government has already disrupted some oil shipments. The Bai Hassan and Avana oil fields near Kirkuk remained shut as of October 19, keeping at least 275,000 bpd offline. The outages are expected to be temporary; a source told Reuters last week that they’re seeking certain equipment to bring the fields back online. An agent at the Turkish port of Ceyhan—the destination for Iraq’s northern oil exports—told Bloomberg that flows fell to 196,000 bpd as of October 19, implying an outage of about 400,000 bpd. Iraq represents the most obvious near-term threat to global supplies, but because the bulk of the country’s output is located in the south, far from the unrest, the potential outage is likely capped at 600,000 bpd, and would probably be temporary.

Iran. This one’s probably the biggest question mark on this list, and is in a much stronger position than its more fragile peers. The danger to Iran is a return of U.S. sanctions, which are by no means a given. Even then, it’s unclear if the U.S. has the ability to curtail Iranian oil exports. It might scare away new investment, but even U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson went to lengths recently to assure European officials that it wouldn’t block business between European companies and Iran. Goldman Sachs estimates that in a relatively worst-case scenario of a return of U.S. sanctions, a few hundred thousand barrels of oil exports would be at risk—not the more than 1 mb/d of disrupted exports due to sanctions before the nuclear deal. At this point, though, potential outages are too hypothetical to be taken seriously. Iran probably won’t pose a supply risk to the market, at least not this year.

Libya. The North African OPEC member was exempted from the OPEC deal, and for much of the past year has represented a downside risk to oil prices, not an upside one. That is because it has nearly tripled its output from about 300,000 bpd in August 2016 up to about 850,000 bpd currently, down a bit from a recent peak at over 1 mb/d. But damage to some export terminals likely means that near-term production has a ceiling at about 1.25 mb/d, meaning Libya won’t be able to bring output back to pre-war levels of 1.6 mb/d. But because current output is now taken for granted and already baked into global pricing calculations, Libya now represents a supply risk to the market because an outage is entirely realistic due to ongoing instability. The country is nearing its ceiling for production, while there’s plenty of room for it to fall back.

Related: Can India Overtake China In The EV Revolution?

Nigeria. The story here is similar to Libya. It was also exempted from the cuts because violence and instability previously knocked a sizable portion of output offline. But Libya’s restoration of output coincided with a similar reduction in violence in the Niger Delta. A ceasefire brought calm for much of the past year, allowing production to rebound from a low point of 1.2 mb/d last year, back up to 1.8 mb/d currently. Potential for further output gains is probably limited, not least because the country promised to limit production when it hit 1.8 mb/d. Meanwhile, peace in the Niger Delta remains fragile, and reports that militants have grown frustrated with the pace of talks with the government raises concerns about a return to violence. The rebound in Nigerian production is not assured.

Venezuela. The unfolding implosion of Venezuela almost ensures that more of the country’s oil production will erode, perhaps at a quickening pace. As of September, Venezuela only produced 1.89 mb/d, down from 3.2 mb/d in the late 1990s, but also down from nearly 2.4 mb/d as recently as 2015. Without cash, state-owned PDVSA can’t invest in new production and can’t even invest in maintenance to keep existing production from falling. Reports have surfaced suggesting that even the oil that is produced is suffering from declining quality, as PDVSA doesn’t have the means to properly treat its heavy crude. Worse, with huge debt payments coming due in the next few weeks, a debt default is possible. All of this adds up to a further deterioration in the country’s oil output.

By Nick Cunningham for Oilprice.com

Missed debt payments revive specter of PdV default

23 Oct 2017, 3.59 pm GMT

Caracas, 23 October (Argus) — Venezuela has missed interest payments totaling $590mn this month on seven bonds totaling a combined $14.75bn of principal as of 21 October, heightening creditor worries of an imminent default if state-owned oil company PdV misses a $984mn interest payment due on 27 October.

"Creditors are on tenterhooks and praying, but still hopeful that PdV won't miss Friday's $984mn payment," Miami-based bond trader Russ Dallen told Argus.

"The seven interest payments already missed this month have a 30-day grace period before they're declared in default, which gives Venezuela some time to catch up before they're actually in default," Dallen said. "It's possible that the government is saving its pennies to make the big bond payments due on 27 October and 2 November."

He noted that the looming $984mn interest payment on the $3.368bn PdV 2020 8.5pc bond does not have a 30-day grace period. "If PdV misses this Friday's payment the impact on the company's operations will be significant and immediate," Dallen added.

Among the immediate effects of a PdV default would be a shutdown of the crude and refined product imports on which the Opec country increasingly depends. Exports and oil tankers would be at risk of seizure.

But Venezuela has proved adept at averting default on several previous occasions in recent years, mainly by selling or mortgaging assets, or using its US downstream subsidiary Citgo to replenish funds.

PdV and the government have more than $3.79bn in combined bond interest maturities due in fourth quarter 2017, including over $1.66bn this month, over $1.89bn in November and $242mn in December.

PdV's fourth quarter maturities total over $2.9bn or over 76pc of the total due before end-2017, of which $984mn are due on 27 October, $90mn on 28 October and $1.169bn on 2 November.

Venezuela has never defaulted on its bond obligations and plans to make all payments due this month without any difficulty, a central bank official told Argus.

But with central bank hard currency reserves at just $9.86bn currently, including about $500mn in cash, it is not clear where PdV and the government will secure the cash needed to pay combined fourth quarter 2017 bond maturities equivalent to over 38pc of the bank's current reserves position.

PdV was two weeks late paying about $229mn of bond interest in September – a delay the company blamed on US financial sanctions.

PdV, the energy ministry and finance ministry all declined to comment on the debt arrears.

But a PdV mid-level finance manager again blamed the company's escalating difficulties on US financial sanctions announced in August.

The US sanctions limit Venezuela's ability to raise revenue through the US financial system, with some exceptions, including commercial trade financing.

Source: http://www.argusmedia.com/news/article/?id=1557642

After 4000 Years, China Eyes Truly Global Role

By COLIN CLARK



Xi Jinping

WASHINGTON: The president of China, seeming to cast aside the better part of four millennia of Chinese tradition, declared today that he sees “a new historic juncture in China’s development,” one that clearly calls for his country to flex its global muscles and change the rules that have guided the world since at least World War II.


Chinese artificial island in the South China Sea
“China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order,” the increasingly powerful Xi Jinping said at the massive Communist Party Congress, held every five years to rubber-stamp the leadership’s ascendancy and signal its intentions to both the Chinese people and the world. “China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country, take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance.”


Chinese artificial island in the South China Sea

To me, this commitment to “reforming and developing” the rules that govern international behavior is the most intriguing. China has consistently rejected international laws and norms, which it views as tools of the western world, led by the United States. Will this mean that China will press for a wholesale rewriting of fundamental documents such as the Geneva Conventions, continue to reject the ruling of international tribunals if it doesn’t like them (remember the ruling on China’s claims in the South China Sea), and press ahead with the global bribery and corruption that marks so much of its “international development efforts” in Asia, Africa and Latin America?


CSBA graphic
Chinese weapons ranges (CSBA graphic)

China’s foreign policy will be defined by its “Chinese characteristics,” Xi said in his really long speech, three-and-a-half hours. “China will never pursue development at the expense of others’ interests, but nor will China ever give up its legitimate rights and interests,” he said. Clearly signaling that actions such as those of building fake islands in the South China Sea and challenging the Vietnamese over oil and other economic claims will not cease, the Chinese supreme leader said: “No one should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests.”

After its establishment of China’s first overseas military base at Djibouti, the declaration of the almost trillion dollar “Belt and Road Initiative,” and now Xi’s speech today, there seems little doubt the Chinese supreme leader wants his country to boast not regional but global influence, in stark contrast to all but a tiny sliver of its history.


Chinese J-20 fighter prototype
Xi made his comments about international relations just three weeks before President Trump pays his first visit to the world’s fastest rising power. He seemed to offer a rebuke to the Trump administration’s America First approach, saying: “No country can alone address the many challenges facing humanity; no country can afford to retreat into isolation.” By contrast, he said, “China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order.” So, while Trump withdraws from or tries to renegotiate international agreements, alienates allies and focuses his efforts on Pittsburgh, not Paris, Xi seems to be indicating that the Chinese will press ahead, engaging where they can in their own interests.

If you want some idea of just how gay and happy Xi believes the future to be, just read this poster which a colleague at the New Yorker says was posted at the party congress: “Life in China Is Good! Everyday Is Like a Holiday!”

Will the rest of the world enjoy the Chinese holiday or will it pine for the good old days of the Pax Americana?

 Read  more at: Breaking Defense

The Bolsheviks in Beijing

What the Chinese Communist Party Learned From Lenin

By Nick Frisch

his week, after months of factional jockeying, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his colleagues will convene the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress. At the conclave's end, Xi will walk into a cavernous room in the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, flanked by China’s new rulers.

Xi and his colleagues head the bureaucracies that manage China's economy, military, propaganda apparatus, and security organs. But on this occasion, they will appear in their most important capacity: as the members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, China’s top decision-making body. This group will govern China until the next party congress, in 2022.

For party leaders, this week marks another half decade in power. But it will also bring a different anniversary, which Beijing will greet without fanfare. The 19th Party Congress falls on the eve of the centenary of Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, the movement that led to the creation of the Soviet Union.

China's leaders are attentive students of Soviet history, and the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state they built are both a model and a cautionary tale for the Chinese Communist Party. Memories of the Soviet collapse—the trauma of toppled statues, indigent apparatchiks, and secret archives opened to public scrutiny—steel party leaders’ determination to retain power.

Read more at www.foreignaffairs.com

Twice the Firepower at Extended Range

Raytheon’s DeepStrike™ system delivers overmatch at a fraction of the cost

Emerging enemy threats—primarily, the use of long-range rockets against infantry and armored formations at extended ranges—put the traditional U.S. and coalition advantages on the battlefield at risk.

This threat, coupled with an aging U.S. long-range rocket inventory, could jeopardize combat forces in a future conflict. A threat of this nature hasn’t existed in such a way since the height of the Cold War.

“Near-peer” adversaries are quickly evolving into pure peer threats, equipped with weapons and capabilities that they didn’t have even five years ago.

Using advanced long-range weapons, an enemy attack on allied forces could begin with a volley of long- range rockets deep into our territory.

To overcome and defeat this threat, Raytheon is developing a long-range missile system, DeepStrike, for the Army’s Long-Range Precision Fires requirement. DeepStrike will allow the Army to field twice as many missiles compared to the aging ATACMS system on its existing launch vehicles.

Thin and sleek, it will fire two missiles from a single weapons pod at half the cost per missile compared to ATACMS. The new missile also flies farther, packs more punch and has a more accurate and robust guidance system than ATACMS.

“Raytheon can develop, test, and field this new capability and we are working with the Army to deliver our LRPF solution sooner than original estimates,” said J.R. Smith, Director of Raytheon Missile Systems’ Advanced Land Warfare Systems directorate. “LRPF provides soldiers on the battlefield overmatch against adversaries.”

The DeepStrike missile system is primarily meant to attack a wide range of fixed ground targets deep beyond enemy lines.

Because current missiles have limitations in range and other important LRPF requirements, a simple life-extension program cannot address long-term threats.

Along with increased firing capacity, the DeepStrike system boosts range over existing weapons by 40 percent. Earlier this year, Raytheon entered the technological maturation stage of the LRPF program. Drawing from its experience producing advanced weapons systems, Raytheon will deliver initial DeepStrike system rounds for Army evaluation within the next 24 to 30 months.

Delivering new capabilities on this timeline will enable the U.S. Army and its allies to maintain to superiority against adversaries—a concept known as overmatch.

Source: https://breakingdefense.com/

The Trouble With Arming Ukraine

Sending Lethal Weapons Would Backfire

By Rajan Menon and William Ruger

It’s long past time for the United States to provide Ukraine the lethal defensive assistance it needs to deter and defend against further Russian aggression,” said Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) in August—and not for the first time. McCain is arguably the most influential person in Congress on national security matters, so his words carry weight. But his is hardly a lone voice. Others, including John Herbst, who was U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from mid-2003 to mid-2006, and Alexander Vershbow, an experienced American diplomat and deputy general secretary of NATO from early 2012 until October 2016, agree with McCain. So do former President Bill Clinton’s deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, and a cluster of diplomatic and national security luminaries, who came out of the gate early on this issue in a report released in 2015.

The efforts of these individuals haven’t been in vain. U.S. President Donald Trump will soon decide whether to implement their proposal, and key members of his national security and military team favor doing so, according to recent statements from General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Kurt Volker, Trump’s top negotiator on the Ukraine crisis. Defense Secretary James Mattis has confirmed that the option was being “actively reviewed.”

Those who call for sending lethal arms to Ukraine (the United States and some of its NATO allies already train Ukrainian troops, and the United States has been providing nonlethal arms to Ukraine to the tune of $300 million in 2016 alone) claim that American weaponry will strengthen Kiev’s hand and compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate a just political settlement that ends the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region. 

Source: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2017-10-11/trouble-arming-ukraine?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20171012

The Finnish Model

To Improve Europe’s Militaries, Look North

By Elisabeth Braw

When Mikael Granlund was called up for service in Finland’s military seven years ago, he could have tried to get an exemption. For an elite ice hockey player such as Granlund, who now plays for the National Hockey League team Minnesota Wild, a year in the armed forces can bring serious athletic setbacks. But Granlund didn’t try to be exempted.

“For a Finn, it’s an honor to do military service,” the 25-year-old Granlund said this month. “It’s just something you do if you want your country to stay independent.” What about athletes? “Professional athletes do it, too,” Granlund added. “It’s just something you want to do.”

Granlund is not alone. Each year, several of Finland’s top athletes join the Finnish Defence Forces as conscripts. So do music stars, who could similarly try to be exempted. Though the FDF—like most armed forces—exempts would-be conscripts only for health-related reasons, in many countries young men fake illnesses in order to avoid service. And young star athletes and artists would, one might think, have a good reason to avoid the draft, as their careers could suffer irreparably from a year away from the limelight. (Next year’s cohort of conscripts will include one of the country’s biggest pop stars, Robin, who will enter the navy.)

Indeed, as Granlund’s and Robin’s enlistments show, the FDF has managed a feat that other armed forces could learn from: it has made itself an attractive destination for conscripts and professional troops alike. This helps explain why the armed forces routinely have more applicants than openings for noncommissioned officer positions. According to a May Eurobarometer poll, 95 percent of Finns trust their army, a higher rate than anywhere else in the European Union. (In Germany, 66 percent trust the army; across the EU, the average is 75 percent.)

Read more at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/finland/2017-10-09/finnish-model?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20171012

Turkey Poised to Roll Into Syria

Source: Stratfor

Weeks after Turkish forces started to deploy in large numbers along the border with Syria, adjacent to the province of Idlib, Ankara appears to be on the verge of launching yet another significant military operation into the war-torn country. Unlike Operation Euphrates Shield, which targeted lands occupied by the Islamic State, the upcoming operation into Idlib will be directed toward lands occupied by Syrian rebels. As befitting a convoluted conflict such as Syria, Turkey's advance into Idlib will be assisted by other Syrian rebel groups trained over time by Turkey in neighboring Aleppo province. And according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's latest statements, they will be supported by Russian aviation.

Given that Turkey has for years directly supported rebel factions in Idlib in their fight against Russian- and Iranian-backed loyalist forces, the prospect of Turkish forces advancing into Syria under Russian air cover appears jarring at face value. The signs of a significant shift in direction by Turkey on Syria, however, have been visible for some time. The first indication was the Turkish abandonment of the rebel defense of Aleppo in favor of Operation Euphrates Shield in late 2016. This occurred amid steadily improving ties between Ankara and Moscow despite both sides maintaining opposite positions on the Syrian civil war, at least in principle. There were also increasing signs throughout 2017 of a significant drop in the flow of Turkish supplies to key rebel factions in northern Syria, particularly in Idlib. Turkey instead focused its resources on developing the capabilities of its Syrian rebel proxies that were directly under its management as part of Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Aleppo province.

The biggest shift in Turkey's stance, however, came through the Astana process, where Turkey negotiated at length with Russia and Iran in a number of negotiation rounds in the Kazakh capital on the setup of "de-escalation" zones in Syria. These talks enabled the establishment of a "de-escalation" zone in Idlib, on whose borders Turkish troops are now poised alongside their rebel allies from Operation Euphrates Shield.

Turkey's shifting position over the past 18 months that is now culminating with a military operation into rebel-held lands can be explained by three overarching factors. The first is the dawning realization in Ankara that the rebels it supported were on the losing end of a conflict with Iran- and Russia-backed loyalist forces. Every major loyalist victory that bolstered Syrian government control in northern Syria, in turn, diminished Turkey's ability to influence events in the country.

The second factor was the growing power of independently minded rebel groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in northern Syria, particularly in Idlib province. As rebel forces suffered successive defeats and despaired from ever receiving enough external support to match the level of direct backing Iran and Russia gave loyalist forces on the battlefield, they became increasingly prone to defect and turn to the better resourced and organized hardline groups such as the al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This trend has only accelerated in recent months with the end of the CIA program that supplied rebel groups in Syria with key weaponry such as anti-tank guided missiles. Unlike the Syrian groups supported by Turkey — and previously by the United States — in northern Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has no compunction in upholding its own interests over Ankara's. Indeed, in recent months, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has even monopolized control over Idlib province by cracking down on Turkish-backed rebel groups. For Turkey, the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib threatens to entirely remove what little influence it has remaining in the province.

Finally, and most important, Turkey has consistently prioritized its goal of undermining and pushing back against Kurdish empowerment in Syria over its desire for regime change in Damascus. Before the United States started to provide significant support to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces in 2015, and before the loyalists started to regain momentum in the conflict that same year, Turkey could undermine the Kurds and pursue regime change in Damascus through its support of rebel forces. However, as the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces spread their control over northern Syria and as the rebel hold was reduced through consecutive loyalist offensives, Turkey could no longer rely on weakened and distracted rebel forces to act as a bulwark against the Kurds, much less topple the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. To that end, Ankara has increasingly prioritized an improved relationship with Moscow in the hopes that the influence leveraged through that relationship would allow it to counter the emboldened Kurds. For instance, Turkey still can hope to translate a cooperative mission in Idlib with the Russians into an opening for a subsequent operation against the Kurdish forces of the People's Protection Units (YPG) in Afrin canton, which are thus far insulated by a Russian presence.

A Turkish operation into Idlib province is nevertheless not without considerable risk. Indeed, there is even a possibility that it could backfire on Ankara. First, there is still no guarantee that such an operation would translate into increased Russian assistance against the YPG and predominantly Kurdish Syria Democratic Forces. Moscow, after all, has maintained its ties with the Syrian Kurds and has even blocked Turkish operations against the Kurds in the past. Further, Turkey and its local rebel allies may find themselves going up against very determined resistance from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fighters, many of whom are locals, and operating in terrain that is geographically more challenging than that faced by Turkey and its proxies during Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey, however, appears determined to tolerate the risks as it seeks to expand its presence and control in Syria in pursuit of its greater objectives.