Sunday, October 28, 2012

U.S. Expands Secretive Drone Base for African Shadow War

This article from http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/

An Air Force Predator drone in New Mexico in 2010. Photo: Air Force
An Air Force Predator drone in New Mexico in 2010. Photo: Air Force


The Pentagon’s secretive drone and commando base in the Horn of Africa is getting a lot bigger and a lot busier as the U.S. doubles down on its shadowy campaign of air strikes, robot surveillance and Special Operation Forces raids in the terror havens of Yemen and Somalia.
Camp Lemonnier, originally a French colonial outpost in Djibouti, a tiny, impoverished nation just north of Somalia, has been the epicenter of America’s Indian Ocean shadow war since just after 9/11. What was once little more than a run-down compound adjacent to Djibouti city’s single-runway international airport is now a sprawling complex of hangars and air-conditioned buildings housing eight Predator drones andeight F-15E fighter-bombers plus other warplanes, as well as around 300 Special Operations Forces and more than 2,000 other U.S. troops and civilians.
According to an investigation by The Washington Post, the Pentagon is spending $1.4 billion to expand the base’s airplane parking and living facilities. The extra housing could accommodate another 800 commandos, the Post reports. The military is also adding new lighting to a emergency landing strip a few miles from Camp Lemonnier — an urgent precaution as more and more planes and drones pack onto the main base’s sole runway.
The Djibouti base is just one of a constellation of hush-hush U.S. drone, commando or intelligence facilities in East Africa. Others are located in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and the island nation of the Seychelles. But “those operations pale in comparison to what is unfolding in Djibouti,” the Post’s Craig Whitlock notes.
As previously reported by Danger Room, the scale and intensity of covert U.S. operations in Djibouti has increased steadily since 2001. Navy SEALs, Army Delta Force commandos and other Special Operations Forces stage from Djibouti on surveillance infiltrations, counter-terrorism raids, hostage rescues and pirate take-downs. And those are just the operations we know about.
The CIA’s armed Predator drones operated from Camp Lemonnier as early as 2002. In November of that year, an Agency Predator crew, following tips from the NSA, tracked al-Qaida operative Qaed Salim Sinan Al Harethi, one of the men who had organized the October 2000 attack on the U.S. Navy destroyerCole, to a car in Yemen. The drone launched a single Hellfire missile, killing Al Harethi and several other men.
Drones came and went at Camp Lemonnier on a temporary basis between 2002 and 2010, joining a little-mentioned force of F-15 fighter-bombers deployed to the desert base for high-speed bombing runs over Yemen. In 2007 a Predator apparently flying from Djibouti struck a convoy near the southern Somali town of Ras Kamboni, killing Aden Hashi Farah, one of Somalia’s top al-Qaida operatives.
In 2010, the Pentagon made the drone presence at Lemonnier full-time, with eight Predators permanently assigned. In September last year, a Djibouti-based Predator took out Anwar Al Awlaki, an American-born cleric and top al-Qaida member.
As the pace of drone and other warplane flights increased, so too did the number of flying accidents. A Special Operations Command U-28 spy plane crashed in February, killing four airmen. The Post details five Predator crashes at or near Lemonnier since January 2011. Besides providing evidence of a ramp-up in the U.S. shadow war, the crashes represent a window into the little-discussed methods of America’s commando forces. One Air Force drone accident report from last year mentions a commando officer, identified only as “Frog,” whose job it was to alert the Air Force crews to launch their drones on covert missions.
“Who is Frog?” one investigator asked, according to a transcript obtained by the Post. “He’s a Pred guy,” an airman responded. “I actually don’t know his last name.”
That level of secrecy is typical of Pentagon activities in Djibouti. Thanks to the Post’s excellent reporting, we now know just a tiny bit more about America’s expanding shadow war in East Africa.

Monday, October 22, 2012

India and Pakistan Missile Flexing: Cruising Towards Regional Instability


The Agni-V is based on the Agni-III, shown here during its fourth test flight. (Photo: DRDO)

Missile testing is currently at an all time high in South Asia. The Indian Navy’s successful test of the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile on 6 October 2012, was the third missile test this month with at least another test (the indigenously built Nirbhay cruise missile) expected in October. The flurry of missile tests in the last few months conducted by both India and Pakistan indicates a competition of one-upmanship that may have negative consequences for strategic stability in the region. In this context, it is important to ascertain what kinds of danger are posed by the testing of such strategic and non-strategic missiles. Can persistent missile testing in the region contain the potential to destabilise South Asian strategic stability? 

MISSILES TESTED 

The year 2012 has reportedly seen India acquire ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) and SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) capacity with the successful testing of the Agni V and the Sagarika/K-15. The Agni V’s declared range of 5000 kms though does not technically qualify it to be an ICBM. Nevertheless, Pakistan and China have not been silent spectators. Pakistan’s response to the Agni V was the intermediate range ballistic missile Shaheen 1A. But the more recent test of the nuclear capable Hatf-VII Babur stealth cruise missile is a more worrying development from the Indian perspective. The Hatf-VII not only possesses the capacity to penetrate advanced air defence systems and ballistic missile defence systems but its range of 700kms also makes this low flying terrain hugging stealth missile a major threat to a large part of North India.

The Indian response to the challenge laid down by the Hatf-VII has been the BrahMos cruise missile that has been jointly developed by the Engineering Research and Production Association of Russia with the Indian DRDO (Defense Research and Development Organisation). The latest version of the BrahMos tested this week was an anti ship missile that flies at a speed of Mach 2.8 and is designed to hit all classes of warships. The Tribune reports that the Talwar class frigate INS Teg, from which the test was conducted has already been armed with this type of missile and two other frigates from the same class – INS Tarkash and INS Trikand shall also be armed with the missile in vertical launch mode.

Meanwhile, according to DRDO Director General, V.K.Saraswat, the turbo jet powered 1000km range subsonic cruise missile, Nirbhay is also ready to be tested this month. This missile shall reportedly possess loitering capability, making it possible to change its target after being fired.

RECENT MISSILE TESTS IN SOUTH ASIA (SINCE AGNI V)*

• 19 April 
- Missile: Agni V
- Type: ICBM (3-10 MIRV)
- Range: 5000km + (Chinese dispute, 8000km) 
- Payload: 1500kg
- Nuclear: Yes

• 25 April 
- Missile: Shaheen IA
- Type: IRBM
- Range: 2500-3000km (estd) (officially not released)
- Payload: 200-300kg (Nuclear Warhead), 500-600kg (Conventional) 
- Nuclear: Yes

• 25 August 
- Missile: Prithvi II
- Type: SRBM (user trial by Army)
- Range: 5000km + (Chinese dispute, 8000km) 
- Payload: 500kg (Nuclear and Conventional)
- Nuclear: Yes

• 17 September
- Missile: Hatf VII Babur
- Type: Cruise Missile (Stealth)
- Range: 700km
- Payload: 450kg (Nuclear and Conventional)
- Nuclear: Yes

• 19 September
- Missile: Agni IV
- Type: IRBM
- Range: 4000km
- Payload: 1 Tonne Nuclear Warhead
- Nuclear: Yes

• 21 September
- Missile: Agni III
- Type: IRBM
- Range: 3000km
- Payload: 1.5 Tonnes (Nuclear and Conventional)
- Nuclear: Yes

• 4 October 
- Missile: Prithvi II (User trial by the Army)
- Type: SRBM
- Range: 350km
- Payload: 500kg (Nuclear and Conventional)
- Nuclear: Yes

• 5 October 
- Missile: Dhanush (Sea Variant of the Prithvi)
- Type: SRBM
- Range: 350km
- Payload: 500kg (Nuclear and Conventional)
- Nuclear: Yes

• 6 October 
- Missile: BrahMos 
- Type: Cruise Missile (Super Sonic)
- Range: 290km
- Payload: 300kg 
- Nuclear: No

• Expected in November
- Missile: Nirbhay
- Type: Cruise Missile (Sub Sonic)
- Range: 1000km
- Payload: Undisclosed
- Nuclear: -

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

Missile testing ostensibly showcases technological development and strength. But the way India and Pakistan have generated visibility for their respective missile development programmes is a definite case of both the defence establishments trying to ‘outflex’ each other.

These developments are not favourable to South Asian strategic stability, which is precariously balanced on the notion of nuclear deterrence. The recent spate of non strategic weapons tests can only destabilise the region. Indian superiority over Pakistan’s conventional military strength has been hitherto undisputed. The entry of the Hatf-VII changes this equation by making a huge part of North Indian territory vulnerable to attack in a more cost effective manner than building ballistic missiles. 

Indian knee jerk responses, having already tested the 4000km range Agni IV ballistic missile and the BrahMos in October, as well as the expected test of the Nirbhay is sure to coax Pakistan into reciprocating. The frequent reminder of one’s capability to penetrate the other’s defences is not a healthy or intelligent roadmap towards attaining or maintaining strategic stability. It is believed though, that this is a part of a larger strategy by India to lure Pakistan into a ‘race’ that the latter can neither win, nor economically support. If that is indeed the case, Indian policy makers must be reminded that an economically drained Pakistan, plunged headlong towards internal instability is not in the best interests of Indian security. As the dominant South Asian power too, Indian actions should be responsibly guided towards larger regional stability. Accentuating the security dilemma does not fit that bill. 


----
By Debak Das, Research Intern
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)

____
*This is a list collated with information available from public sources. The details of some of the payloads and ranges are meant to be indicative and not exact. Certain Missiles have been tested multiple times. The list only indicated the last date of test. 

Read more at: http://www.defpro.com/

Sunday, October 21, 2012

Kh-65 / Kh-SD Kh-101

Article from Federation of American Scientist website:




As of 1996 it was reported that at least two next-generation strategic cruise missiles were under development. By late 2000 very few details had emerged concerning either program, neither of which appeared to have received Western designations. It is reported that Russian Air Force plans call for upgrading the Tu-95MS `Bear-H' bomber to carry up to eight Kh-101 or 14 Kh-65 cruise missiles. The status of a plan for the Tu-160 to carry 12 Kh-101s or Kh-65s is unclear, and may have been cancelled.

The long-range Kh 101 cruise missile is under development for long-range aviation. It was apparebtly first launched in October of 1998 by Tu-160 during 37th Air Army exercises. It will reportedly be employed with either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. The conventional warhead version required the use of a highly accurate guidance system, which reportedly provides a circular error probable of 12-20 meters. An electro-optic flight path correction system uses a terrain map stored in its onboard computer, as well as a TV-seeker for the terminal stage of flight. The Kh-101's launch weight is 2,200-2,400kg and its maximum speed is Mach 0.77. The range of this system probably exceeds 3,000km, and some reports claim a range of as great as 5000 km.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced in January 1992 that he would end the manufacture of all sea- and air- launched cruise missiles. In March 2000 it was reported that the Russian Air Force had tested a new cruise missile with a conventional warhead. It was said to be a Kh-555 missile, which was developed from the Kh-55, with a range of 2000 - 3000 km. The relationship between the "Kh-555" and the Kh-101, with evidently similar characteristics, is unclear.

The Kh-65, also known as the Kh-SD, is reportedly a smaller version of the Kh-101. It is said to be shorter and lighter [by some 600-800kg], with a much shorter range of only several hundred kilometres. It probably uses the same homing system as the Kh-101, but may a Kh-65S anti-ship version may have an active radar seeker. The fact of the existence of this program was first disclosed in data sheets released at the 1992 Moscow Air Show, at which time it appeared to be a tactical derivative of the Kh-55 Granat [AS-15 Kent] strategic cruise missile. More recently, it is described as the short range tactical version of the Kh-101.

Based on the reported association between the Kh-55 and the Kh-65, it is probably the case that the Kh-101 is a derivative of the previous Kh-55.