At the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace exhibition 2013, Navy Recognition exclusively learned that the 6 future Gowind class Corvettes (Littoral Combat Ship program) will be fitted with 57mm Mark 3 main guns with stealth cupola from BAE Systems Bofors. We also took the opportunity to get the latest updates on the Malaysian LCS program from Anuar Murad, Director of Defence and Security at Boustead Heavy Industry Corporation.
Anuar Murad, Director of Defence & Security Division at BHIC, gave us the latest updates on the Gowind design for the Royal Malayasian Navy Littoral Combat Ship program.
It was confirmed during LIMA that the combat management system will be the SETIS by DCNS, the Fire Control Systems will be provided by Rheinmetall, and the engines will be provided by MTU. The design seems to have increased in size with the length of the LCS now at 111 meters (compared to 107 as previously reported) with a displacement of about 3,000 tons (compared to full load displacement of 2,730 tonnes as previously announced).
Integrated with SETIS, a combat system derived from FREMM class Frigates, Gowind Combat can tackle air, surface and submarine threats. The shock-resistant platform (built according to military standards), the small radar cross-section together with an excellent acoustic signature makes it a high-performance surface combatant.
Gowind Combat can be operated by a limited crew and has been designed to offer great at-sea availability and reduced life cycle costs.
Read more at: http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=999
Sunday, April 28, 2013
Seoul Plans Phased-Development, Typhoon-Size Fighter
By Bradley Perrett
Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology
Throughout its long gestation, KF-X has faced repeated objections: that it is unaffordable, or at least unjustifiable; that the country lacks the skills to develop it, or at least has too few engineers, especially if it pursues civil airplane and military helicopter programs at the same time; that the U.S., as a technology supplier, would seek to block KF-X sales; and, perhaps above all, that the South Korean fighter cannot offer much that is not already on the market at a lower price.
But backers, particularly ADD, present KF-X as the keystone in South Korea's future military aviation development. It would not just be a home-produced fighter; it would become the host aircraft of South Korean combat aircraft systems, such as sensors and weapons, promoting wider advances in the defense industry. South Korea would be in complete control of its configuration, not needing foreign permission to integrate its systems, as it has for the T-50 supersonic trainer and its combat variants.
In evolving the design and program, ADD has sought to address doubts about South Korea's technological capacity and the aircraft's technological adequacy. In 2009, the developers acknowledged that South Korea could not build a fully stealthy aircraft, equivalent to the F-35. They relaxed the radar cross-section to the level of such aircraft as the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon.
That radar cross-section is likely to be in the range of 0.1-1 sq. meters (1.07-10.07 sq. ft.), compared with 1-10 sq. meters for old F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighters in South Korean service, says a former air force officer who has been involved in planning for KF-X and other programs. KF-X's intended cross-section “is low enough,” he says, pointing to an official but unpublished study showing gaps in the coverage of North Korean surveillance radars when dealing with such a target. Those gaps exist even without electronic countermeasures degrading the performance of the radars, the study shows.
While the designers relaxed the stealth specification, they notably did not much change the aircraft's external shape and configuration, the foundation of low radar cross-section. The KF-X kept classic stealth features such as parallel edges and surfaces, forward fuselage chines and curved engine inlet ducts. That has allowed ADD this year to propose reintroduction of high-grade stealth in later KF-X versions. Block 2 would have more stealth coatings, radar-absorbing structural materials, tighter control of gaps, “integrated” (presumably flush) aerials, and a weapons bay. It would be as stealthy as an F-117, ADD estimates. Further, unstated improvements would advance Block 3 to the level of the F-35.
These improvements would be added with new systems. So KF-X would, in the end, significantly outperform current fighters—just not immediately.
Since settling on moderate stealth, ADD has been studying two main variables in its design: the number of engines, and the location of horizontal stabilizers. It has settled the first issue—the aircraft will have two engines—but the second issue will depend on the origins of the experienced foreign partner. The KF-X will have conventional aft stabilizers, following concept Design C103, if a U.S. company helps develop it; and forward stabilizers, for Design C203, if a European partner is chosen.
Size appears to have been set by the choice of two engines, the preference of the air force. “We do not have a rubber engine,” says an engineer familiar with the project, meaning that the designers must choose one off the shelf, not have one designed for their specification. So they see available afterburning thrust as 17,700 lb. (from the General Electric F404), 20,200 lb. (from Eurojet EJ200) or 22,000 lb. (from GE F414). The Snecma M88 is not mentioned as a candidate.
The thrust ratings straddle what is available to the Typhoon, and so it is not surprising that the airframes, for both C103 and C203, have been sized for an empty aircraft mass very close to that of the European fighter. Reflecting the great volume typical of stealth designs (partly because snaking inlet ducts demand a bulky fuselage), C103 and C203 each have more internal fuel than the Typhoon.
Also relying on airframe volume, the designers are contriving to work a weapons bay into the Block 2 version. In the Block 1 variant, four Raytheon AIM-120 air-to-air missiles are mounted in recesses under the fuselage, a favorite approach introduced by the Phantom's designers about 60 years ago (see cover photo). Those missiles must move inside the bay for the Block 2 KF-X; there is not enough space to have both a bay and external under-fuselage weapons. Provision for the weapon bay will be in the Block 1 aircraft, ADD says, which must mean that internal equipment will be packaged in some way to easily make space available.
Six more hard points for weapons and other stores are on the wing, the outer two available only for Raytheon AIM-9X short-range air-to-air missiles. ADD's drawings show the others with air-to-ground weapons: GBU-39, GBU-53, CBU-105, GBU-31, GBU-38 and GBU-24 guided bombs and AGM-65 missiles. External fuel tanks are an option for the inner pair of hard points, and models show cruise missiles mounted in those positions, too. There are no wingtip hard points, presumably to restrict radar reflections, but models show sensor pods on the lower corners of the fuselage.
A gun is mounted internally above the left inlet duct.
The prime sensor for KF-X will be a radar with an active, electronically scanned array. A foreign radar will be installed first, while a later version of the fighter will be outfitted with a set based on work that South Korean electronics company LIG Nex1 is undertaking. The designers are also specifying an electro-optical targeting system, an infrared search and track sensor, data link, GPS-INS navigation, “advanced threat warning and countermeasures” and internal electronic countermeasures.
The cockpit will incorporate a helmet-mounted display, a head-up display and multifunction head-down displays. In integrating electronics and weapons, the program intends to follow Western design standards, hence the advantage that KF-X, if built, will hold over Chinese and Russian rivals. Introducing new U.S., European or indeed South Korean equipment should be easier.
The wing of the C103 (tail-aft) version has full-span flaperons and leading-edge flaps for variable camber. The planform is a diamond shape, with 40 deg. leading-edge sweep and 10-deg. forward sweep for the trailing edge.
When the C103 and C203 designs were discussed in February, there was a hint that the two-seat option had been rejected, along with such variants as a single-engine aircraft. But ADD's latest description of the aircraft does show a version with a second seat that replaces the forward fuselage fuel tank. Although the U.S. has decided that simulation obviates the need for a trainer version of the F-35, a second seat is becoming popular again in other fighters for a reason that was familiar decades ago but then fell out of fashion: two people can handle the work of a combat mission more easily than one.
Tap the icon in the digital edition of AW&ST to see a timeline of KF-X program, or go to AviationWeek.com/kfx
Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology
In all of the West, only one all-new fighter, the Lockheed Martin F-35, is in full-scale development. If it outlasts its predecessors, as new products usually do, it could find itself to be the last man standing. The F-35 will have Russian and Chinese competition, but only the U.S. fighter is likely to be engineered to standards that facilitate integration of Western weapons and sensors. For many countries, there will be no real alternative.
Or maybe there will be: a Western fighter from the East.
After at least a decade of studies, the design of South Korea's proposed KF-X fighter is becoming clearer. If it goes ahead, and if it is not heavily revised, it will be a two-engine fighter of the size of the Eurofighter Typhoon, perhaps following the Typhoon and other European fighters in mounting its horizontal stabilizers forward (see specifications table, page 48). It will be designed for Western, especially U.S., weapons and sensors, although later South Korean equipment will be fitted.
First mooted within the government in 1999, and announced as a national objective in 2002, KF-X has been under study for 14 years, repeatedly failing to gain authorization for full-scale development, which it still awaits. Early in the program, the targeted in-service date was 2015; now, it cannot fly before 2021, and therefore cannot be operational until middle 2020s, if it survives powerful opposition (see page 49).
In the air force's planning, KF-X will be a medium fighter, at first serving alongside and then replacing the KF-16, the locally built version of the F-16. Fighters above the KF-S rated as “high” grade—mainly meaning a greater payload range—would be the Boeing F-15K and whichever aircraft is chosen for the current F-X Phase 3 competition (AW&ST April 15, p. 52). Below it will be the Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) FA-50.
The driving force for a fighter to fill this role has been the defense ministry's Agency for Defense Development (ADD). Program Director Lee Daeyearl answers to ADD chief H.Y. Paik. The ADD is handling the preliminary design and will oversee full-scale development and integration, if KF-X is approved, say government officials. So KAI, the country's combat aircraft specialist, would be only a supplier and, presumably, the detail designer of the airframe. It would not be surprising if the aerospace division of Korean Airlines made some parts. A foreign company would supply the engines. Electronics would come from several manufacturers.
At the top level, a foreign partner will be needed, probably the winner of F-X Phase 3, which means Boeing, Lockheed Martin or the Eurofighter partners. Most South Korean advocates of the program play down the intended role of outsiders. The KF-X will be led by South Koreans, they emphasize. Indonesia, which has contributed engineers and 20% of the funding since 2011 and proposes to order 50, is a junior partner, which is why the aircraft is sometimes called KF-X/IF-X. Attempts to enlist Turkey failed, partly because the South Koreans insisted on leadership; other partners are possible, but none have appeared so far.
But backers, particularly ADD, present KF-X as the keystone in South Korea's future military aviation development. It would not just be a home-produced fighter; it would become the host aircraft of South Korean combat aircraft systems, such as sensors and weapons, promoting wider advances in the defense industry. South Korea would be in complete control of its configuration, not needing foreign permission to integrate its systems, as it has for the T-50 supersonic trainer and its combat variants.
In evolving the design and program, ADD has sought to address doubts about South Korea's technological capacity and the aircraft's technological adequacy. In 2009, the developers acknowledged that South Korea could not build a fully stealthy aircraft, equivalent to the F-35. They relaxed the radar cross-section to the level of such aircraft as the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon.
That radar cross-section is likely to be in the range of 0.1-1 sq. meters (1.07-10.07 sq. ft.), compared with 1-10 sq. meters for old F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighters in South Korean service, says a former air force officer who has been involved in planning for KF-X and other programs. KF-X's intended cross-section “is low enough,” he says, pointing to an official but unpublished study showing gaps in the coverage of North Korean surveillance radars when dealing with such a target. Those gaps exist even without electronic countermeasures degrading the performance of the radars, the study shows.
While the designers relaxed the stealth specification, they notably did not much change the aircraft's external shape and configuration, the foundation of low radar cross-section. The KF-X kept classic stealth features such as parallel edges and surfaces, forward fuselage chines and curved engine inlet ducts. That has allowed ADD this year to propose reintroduction of high-grade stealth in later KF-X versions. Block 2 would have more stealth coatings, radar-absorbing structural materials, tighter control of gaps, “integrated” (presumably flush) aerials, and a weapons bay. It would be as stealthy as an F-117, ADD estimates. Further, unstated improvements would advance Block 3 to the level of the F-35.
These improvements would be added with new systems. So KF-X would, in the end, significantly outperform current fighters—just not immediately.
Since settling on moderate stealth, ADD has been studying two main variables in its design: the number of engines, and the location of horizontal stabilizers. It has settled the first issue—the aircraft will have two engines—but the second issue will depend on the origins of the experienced foreign partner. The KF-X will have conventional aft stabilizers, following concept Design C103, if a U.S. company helps develop it; and forward stabilizers, for Design C203, if a European partner is chosen.
Size appears to have been set by the choice of two engines, the preference of the air force. “We do not have a rubber engine,” says an engineer familiar with the project, meaning that the designers must choose one off the shelf, not have one designed for their specification. So they see available afterburning thrust as 17,700 lb. (from the General Electric F404), 20,200 lb. (from Eurojet EJ200) or 22,000 lb. (from GE F414). The Snecma M88 is not mentioned as a candidate.
The thrust ratings straddle what is available to the Typhoon, and so it is not surprising that the airframes, for both C103 and C203, have been sized for an empty aircraft mass very close to that of the European fighter. Reflecting the great volume typical of stealth designs (partly because snaking inlet ducts demand a bulky fuselage), C103 and C203 each have more internal fuel than the Typhoon.
Also relying on airframe volume, the designers are contriving to work a weapons bay into the Block 2 version. In the Block 1 variant, four Raytheon AIM-120 air-to-air missiles are mounted in recesses under the fuselage, a favorite approach introduced by the Phantom's designers about 60 years ago (see cover photo). Those missiles must move inside the bay for the Block 2 KF-X; there is not enough space to have both a bay and external under-fuselage weapons. Provision for the weapon bay will be in the Block 1 aircraft, ADD says, which must mean that internal equipment will be packaged in some way to easily make space available.
Six more hard points for weapons and other stores are on the wing, the outer two available only for Raytheon AIM-9X short-range air-to-air missiles. ADD's drawings show the others with air-to-ground weapons: GBU-39, GBU-53, CBU-105, GBU-31, GBU-38 and GBU-24 guided bombs and AGM-65 missiles. External fuel tanks are an option for the inner pair of hard points, and models show cruise missiles mounted in those positions, too. There are no wingtip hard points, presumably to restrict radar reflections, but models show sensor pods on the lower corners of the fuselage.
A gun is mounted internally above the left inlet duct.
The prime sensor for KF-X will be a radar with an active, electronically scanned array. A foreign radar will be installed first, while a later version of the fighter will be outfitted with a set based on work that South Korean electronics company LIG Nex1 is undertaking. The designers are also specifying an electro-optical targeting system, an infrared search and track sensor, data link, GPS-INS navigation, “advanced threat warning and countermeasures” and internal electronic countermeasures.
The cockpit will incorporate a helmet-mounted display, a head-up display and multifunction head-down displays. In integrating electronics and weapons, the program intends to follow Western design standards, hence the advantage that KF-X, if built, will hold over Chinese and Russian rivals. Introducing new U.S., European or indeed South Korean equipment should be easier.
The wing of the C103 (tail-aft) version has full-span flaperons and leading-edge flaps for variable camber. The planform is a diamond shape, with 40 deg. leading-edge sweep and 10-deg. forward sweep for the trailing edge.
When the C103 and C203 designs were discussed in February, there was a hint that the two-seat option had been rejected, along with such variants as a single-engine aircraft. But ADD's latest description of the aircraft does show a version with a second seat that replaces the forward fuselage fuel tank. Although the U.S. has decided that simulation obviates the need for a trainer version of the F-35, a second seat is becoming popular again in other fighters for a reason that was familiar decades ago but then fell out of fashion: two people can handle the work of a combat mission more easily than one.
Tap the icon in the digital edition of AW&ST to see a timeline of KF-X program, or go to AviationWeek.com/kfx
Sunday, April 21, 2013
Mexico's Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges
Editor's Note: This Security Weekly assesses the most significant cartel-related developments of the first quarter of 2013 and provides updated profiles of Mexico's powerful criminal cartels, as well as a forecast for the rest of this year. It's the executive summary of a more detailed report available to clients of our Mexico Security Monitor service.
For bigger picture click here.
Read more: Mexico's Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges | Stratfor
By Tristan Reed
Tactical Analyst
Tactical Analyst
Balkanization of Cartels
Since the late 1980s demise of the Guadalajara cartel, which controlled drug trade routes into the United States through most of Mexico, Mexican cartels have followed a trend of fracturing into more geographically compact, regional crime networks. This trend, which we are referring to as "Balkanization," has continued for more than two decades and has impacted all of the major cartel groups in Mexico. Indeed the Sinaloa Federation lost significant assets when the organizations run by Beltran Leyva and Ignacio Coronel split away from it. Los Zetas, currently the other most powerful cartel in Mexico, was formed when it split off from the Gulf cartel in 2010. Still these two organizations have fought hard to resist the trend of fracturing and have been able to grow despite being affected by it. This led to the polarized dynamic observed in 2011 when these two dominant Mexican cartels effectively split Mexican organized crime in two, with one group composed of Los Zetas and its allies and the other composed of the Sinaloa Federation and its allies.
For bigger picture click here.
This trend toward polarization has since been reversed, however, as Balkanization has led to rising regional challenges to both organizations since 2012. Most notable among these is the split between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation. The Sinaloa Federation continues to struggle with regional crime groups for control in western Chihuahua state, northern Sinaloa state, Jalisco state and northern Sonora state. Similarly, Los Zetas saw several regional challengers in 2012. Two regional groups saw sharp increases in their operational capabilities during 2012 and through the first quarter of 2013. These were the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Knights Templar.
The Beltran Leyva Organization provides another example of the regionalization of Mexican organized crime. It has become an umbrella of autonomous, and in some cases conflicting, groups. Many of the groups that emerged from it control specific geographic areas and fight among each other largely in isolation from the conflict between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation. Many of these successor crime groups, such as the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos are currently fighting for their own geographic niches. As its name implies, the Independent Cartel of Acapulco mostly acts in Acapulco, while Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos mostly act in Morelos state.
The ongoing fragmentation of Mexican cartels is not likely to reverse, at least not in the next few years. Despite this, while Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation continue to face new rivals and suffer from internal splintering, their resources are not necessarily declining. Neither criminal organization faces implosion or a substantial decline as a transnational criminal organization as a result of rising regional challengers. Both Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation continue to extend their drug trafficking operations on a transnational level, increasing both their influence and profits. Still, they will continue to face the new reality, in which they are forced to work with -- or fight -- regional groups.
Los Zetas
In Hidalgo state, a former Zetas stronghold, the Knights Templar have made significant inroads, although violence has not risen to the level of that in the previously mentioned states. Also, the turf war within Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas states between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas that began when Los Zetas split from the Gulf cartel in 2010 continues.
In light of Ivan "El Taliban" Velazquez Caballero's dissent from Los Zetas and the death of former leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano, Zetas leader Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales could face organizational integrity issues during 2013. Signs of such issues appeared in Cancun during the first quarter when some members of Los Zetas reportedly broke from the group and adopted the Gulf cartel name. Besides possible minor dissent, a seemingly new rival has emerged in Tabasco state to counter Los Zetas. A group called Pueblo Unido Contra la Delincuencia, Spanish for "People United Against Crime," carried out a series of executions in Tabasco state throughout the first quarter, but the group's origins and significance remain unclear. No indicators of substantial splintering among Los Zetas have emerged since the Velazquez split.
Sinaloa Federation
Regional organizations continued to challenge the Sinaloa Federation on its turf in western Chihuahua state, northern Sinaloa state and Jalisco state through the first quarter. Intercartel violence in mountainous western Chihuahua continues as the Sinaloa Federation fights La Linea for control of the region's smuggling routes and drug cultivation areas. Los Mazatlecos so far has maintained its control over northern Sinaloa cities, such as Los Mochis and Guasave. It also has continued violent incursions into southern areas of Sinaloa state, such as Mazatlan, Concordia and El Rosario with its ally Los Zetas.
Gulf Cartel
At the beginning of 2012, Gulf cartel territory appeared likely to be absorbed by larger cartels -- essentially signaling the end of the Gulf cartel. Support from the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar combined with fractures within Los Zetas allowed a Gulf cartel resurgence, leading to a renewed Gulf assault on Los Zetas in the northeastern states of Mexico. The resurgence ended with a series of notable arrests during the last quarter of 2012, such as that of former top leader Jorge Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla Sanchez. The arrests triggered additional Gulf cartel infighting, which peaked in March 2013.
The escalated infighting in the Gulf cartel, particularly in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, highlighted the new state of the Gulf cartel: Instead of operating as a cohesive criminal network, the Gulf cartel now consists of factions linked by history and the Gulf label. The infighting began in 2010 after the death of former top Gulf cartel leader Antonio Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen. The death of Cardenas Guillen split the Gulf cartel into two main factions, Los Rojos and Los Metros. By the first quarter of 2013, infighting had broken out between Los Metros leaders, such as Mario "Pelon" Ramirez Trevino, David "Metro 4" Salgado and Miguel "El Gringo" Villarreal. This suggests the Gulf cartel is further fractured and no longer consists of just two opposing sides. The Gulf cartel may begin acting as a cohesive network during the second quarter after the escalated infighting in March, though this cannot be definitely predicted.
From March 10 to March 19, Reynosa became the focal point for Gulf cartel infighting as Ramirez Trevino escalated his conflict against Villarreal. Ramirez Trevino reportedly expelled Villarreal's faction and its allies from the Reynosa plaza and killed Salgado. This could mean Ramirez Trevino has consolidated control over other Gulf cartel factions. If true, this would represent a substantial shift in organized criminal operations in northeastern Tamaulipas state, where the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar smuggle drugs, people and other illicit commodities through the border towns of Reynosa and Matamoros while Los Zetas maintain a constant interest in fighting for control of the stated cities.
As mentioned during the last annual update, Gulf cartel factions are increasingly reliant on Sinaloa Federation and Knights Templar support to defend the remaining Gulf cartel territory in Tamaulipas state from Los Zetas. This certainly remains true after the first quarter, although the recent shift from Gulf cartel infighting may signal a shift in intercartel dynamics. Since the Gulf cartel in reality consists of separate factions, there is likely a separate relationship between each Gulf cartel faction and the larger criminal organizations reportedly in alignment with them. With Ramirez Trevino now in charge of Reynosa, a city valued by both the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar, his existing relationship with the two organizations will likely influence their strategies for maintaining their interests in Gulf cartel-controlled areas. Additionally, it is not yet clear whether Ramirez Trevino suffered any substantial losses during the March fighting in Reynosa. If he did lose some capabilities fighting Los Zetas in Tamaulipas state, or if he has challenged a faction loyal to either the Sinaloa Federation or the Knights Templar, either organization would likely have to use its own gunmen for defending Gulf cartel-controlled areas or mounting their own incursions into Zetas territory, particularly Nuevo Laredo.
Intercartel violence in the Gulf cartel-controlled city of Reynosa will likely diminish compared to the first quarter of 2013 if Ramirez Trevino has indeed won. This reduction in violence will continue only as long as Ramirez Trevino is able to hold his control over Reynosa. Influence from external organizations, such as Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar, could once again spark violence if Ramirez Trevino's efforts have harmed their trafficking operations through Reynosa or presented a new opportunity to seize control. What, if any, Gulf cartel infighting is ongoing is difficult to gauge.
Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion
The severing of the relationship between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation came to the forefront of conflicts in the Pacific states of Michoacan and Jalisco during the first quarter of 2013. The Sinaloa Federation relied on its alliance with the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion in defending the critical location of Guadalajara from Los Zetas and used the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion as an assault force into Los Zetas strongholds, such as Veracruz state.
Although evidence of the rift between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation began to appear in open-source reporting during the last half of 2012, the conflict between the two organizations only became clear when the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion went on the offensive in Jalisco state by attacking Sinaloa Federation allies Los Coroneles, the Knights Templar and the Gulf cartel.
With a now-fully independent Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the polarization of warring cartels in Mexico has effectively ended. In addition to the existing conflicts between the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation must now focus on reclaiming an operational hold over Jalisco state from the now-rival Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. The second quarter will continue to see a conflict between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and Sinaloa Federation-aligned groups in Jalisco state as well as neighboring states like Michoacan.
Knights Templar
The Knights Templar experienced intensified conflict during the first quarter from their principal rival, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. In an effort to combat the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the Knights Templar have allied with other Sinaloa Federation-aligned groups, the Gulf cartel and Los Coroneles, referring to themselves as "Los Aliados" to fight the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion within Jalisco. Violence as a result of this alliance against the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion has been most notable in the Guadalajara metropolitan area as well as towns lying on highways 15 and 90, which connect to Guadalajara.
In addition to the Knights Templar offensive into Jalisco state, the group is currently defending its stronghold of Michoacan state. The Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion also has conducted violent assaults against the Knights Templar in Michoacan, particularly on routes leading from Jalisco state toward Apatzingan, Michoacan state. This assault has increased intercartel violence along the border of the two states as part of a tit-for-tat dynamic.
Citizens of Buenavista Tomatlan, Michoacan state, a municipality lying amid territory contested by the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Knights Templar, have recently set up a community police force to counter Knights Templar operations in the municipality. As in some other areas of Mexico, this community police force is a volunteer force that assumed law enforcement responsibilities independent of the Mexican government. The community police, while established to thwart the Knights Templar, have created tension between the communities of Buenavista Tomatlan and the government. On March 8, the Mexican military detained approximately 34 members of the community police force that had been created in February in Buenavista Tomatlan.
The Buenavista Tomatlan arrests occurred after the community police took over the municipal police station March 4 and detained the municipal police chief, who the Mexican military later freed. Notably, the Mexican government claimed at least 30 of the detained community police belonged to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. If true, this suggests it has made territorial gains to the point of infiltrating the community police. However, there has been no confirmation on whether the accusations are true. Regardless, the community police force of Buenavista Tomatlan has placed its focus on stopping Knights Templar operations in the area, a focus that could only benefit the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion's war with its rivals.
Read more: Mexico's Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges | Stratfor
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