From the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: Rethinking the Region

By George Friedman
The territory between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush has been the main arena for the U.S. intervention that followed the 9/11 attacks. Obviously, the United States had been engaged in this area in previous years, but 9/11 redefined it as the prime region in which it confronted jihadists. That struggle has had many phases, and it appears to have entered a new one over the past few weeks.
Some parts of this shift were expected. STRATFOR had anticipated tensions between Iran and its neighboring countries to rise as the U.S. withdrew from Iraq and Iran became more assertive. And we expected U.S.-Pakistani relations to reach a crisis before viable negotiations with the Afghan Taliban were made possible.

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However, other events frankly surprised us. We had expected Hamas to respond to events in Egypt and to the Palestine National Authority’s search for legitimacy through pursuit of U.N. recognition by trying to create a massive crisis with Israel, reasoning that the creation of such a crisis would strengthen anti-government forces in Egypt, increasing the chances for creating a new regime that would end the blockade of Gaza and suspend the peace treaty with Israel. We also thought that intense rocket fire into Israel would force Fatah to support an intifada or be marginalized by Hamas. Here we were clearly wrong; Hamas moved instead to reach a deal for the exchange of captive Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit, which has reduced Israeli-Hamas tensions.

Our error was rooted in our failure to understand how the increased Iranian-Arab tensions would limit Hamas’ room to maneuver. We also missed the fact that given the weakness of the opposition forces in Egypt — something we had written about extensively — Hamas would not see an opportunity to reshape Egyptian policies. The main forces in the region, particularly the failure of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the intensification of Iran’s rise, obviated our logic on Hamas. Shalit’s release, in exchange for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, marks a new stage in Israeli-Hamas relations. Let’s consider how this is related to Iran and Pakistan.

The Iranian Game

The Iranians tested their strength in Bahrain, where Shiites rose up against their Sunni rulers with at least some degree of Iranian support. Saudi Arabia, linked by a causeway to Bahrain, perceived this as a test of its resolve, intervening with military force to suppress the demonstrators and block the Iranians. To Iran, Bahrain was simply a probe; the Saudi response did not represent a major reversal in Iranian fortunes.

The main game for Iran is in Iraq, where the U.S. withdrawal is reaching its final phase. Some troops may be left in Iraqi Kurdistan, but they will not be sufficient to shape events in Iraq. The Iranians will not be in control of Iraq, but they have sufficient allies, both in the government and in outside groups, that they will be able to block policies they oppose, either through the Iraqi political system or through disruption. They will not govern, but no one will be able to govern in direct opposition to them.

In Iraq, Iran sees an opportunity to extend its influence westward. Syria is allied with Iran, and it in turn jointly supports Hezbollah in Lebanon. The prospect of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq opened the door to a sphere of Iranian influence running along the southern Turkish border and along the northern border of Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi View

The origins of the uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad are murky. It emerged during the general instability of the Arab Spring, but it took a different course. The al Assad regime did not collapse, al Assad was not replaced with another supporter of the regime, as happened in Egypt, and the opposition failed to simply disintegrate. In our view the opposition was never as powerful as the Western media portrayed it, nor was the al Assad regime as weak. It has held on far longer than others expected and shows no inclination of capitulating. For one thing, the existence of bodies such as The International Criminal Court leave al Assad nowhere to go if he stepped down, making a negotiated exit difficult. For another, al Assad does not see himself as needing to step down.
Two governments have emerged as particularly hostile to al Assad: the Saudi government and the Turkish government. The Turks attempted to negotiate a solution in Syria and were rebuffed by al Assad. It is not clear the extent to which these governments see Syria simply as an isolated problem along their border or as part of a generalized Iranian threat. But it is clear that the Saudis are extremely sensitive to the Iranian threat and see the fall of the al Assad regime as essential for limiting the Iranians.
In this context, the last thing that the Saudis want to see is conflict with Israel. A war in Gaza would have given the al Assad regime an opportunity to engage with Israel, at least through Hezbollah, and portray opponents to the regime as undermining the struggle against the Israelis. This would have allowed al Assad to solicit Iranian help against Israel and, not incidentally, to help sustain his regime.
It was not clear that Saudi support for Syrian Sunnis would be enough to force the al Assad regime to collapse, but it is clear that a war with Israel would have made it much more difficult to bring it down. Whether Hamas was inclined toward another round of fighting with Israel is unclear. What is clear is that the Saudis, seeing themselves as caught in a struggle with Iran, were not going to hand the Iranians an excuse to get more involved than they were. They reined in any appetite Hamas may have had for war.

Hamas and Egypt

Hamas also saw its hopes in Egypt dissolving. From its point of view, instability in Egypt opened the door for regime change. For an extended period of time, it seemed possible that the first phase of unrest would be followed either by elections that Islamists might win or another wave of unrest that would actually topple the regime. It became clear months ago that the opposition to the Egyptian regime was too divided to replace it. But it was last week that the power of the regime became manifest.

The Oct. 9 Coptic demonstration that turned violent and resulted in sectarian clashes with Muslims gave the government the opportunity to demonstrate its resolve and capabilities without directly engaging Islamist groups. The regime acted brutally and efficiently to crush the demonstrations and, just as important, did so with some Islamist elements that took to the streets beating Copts. The streets belonged to the military and to the Islamist mobs, fighting on the same side.
One of the things Hamas had to swallow was the fact that it was the Egyptian government that was instrumental in negotiating the prisoner exchange. Normally, Islamists would have opposed even the process of negotiation, let alone its success. But given what had happened a week before, the Islamists were content not to make an issue of the Egyptian government’s deal-making. Nor would the Saudis underwrite Egyptian unrest as they would Syrian unrest. Egypt, the largest Arab country and one that has never been on good terms with Iran, was one place where the Saudis did not want to see chaos, especially with an increasingly powerful Iran and unrest in Syria stalled.

Washington Sides with Riyadh

In the midst of all this, the United States announced the arrest of a man who allegedly was attempting, on behalf of Iran, to hire a Mexican to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States. There was serious discussion of the significance of this alleged plot, and based on the evidence released, it was not particularly impressive.
Nevertheless — and this is the important part — the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama decided that this was an intolerable event that required more aggressive measures against Iran. The Saudis have been asking the United States for some public action against Iran both to relieve the pressure on Riyadh and to make it clear that the United States was committed to confronting Iran alongside the Saudis. There may well be more evidence in the alleged assassination plot that makes it more serious than it appeared, but what is clear is that the United States intended to use the plot to increase pressure on Iran — psychologically at least — beyond the fairly desultory approach it had been taking. The administration even threw the nuclear question back on the table, a subject on which everyone had been lackadaisical for a while.
The Saudi nightmare has been that the United States would choose to reach an understanding with Iran as a way to create a stable order in the region and guarantee the flow of oil. We have discussed this possibility in the past, pointing out that the American interest in protecting Saudi Arabia is not absolute and that the United States might choose to deal with the Iranians, neither regime being particularly attractive to the United States and history never being a guide to what Washington might do next.
The Saudis were obviously delighted with the U.S. rhetorical response to the alleged assassination plot. It not only assuaged the Saudis’ feeling of isolation but also seemed to close the door on side deals. At the same time, the United States likely was concerned with the possibility of Saudi Arabia trying to arrange its own deal with Iran before Washington made a move. With this action, the United States joined itself at the hip with the Saudis in an anti-Iranian coalition.
The Israelis had nothing to complain about either. They do not want the Syrian regime to fall, preferring the al Assad regime they know to an unknown Sunni — and potentially Islamist — regime. Saudi support for the Syrian opposition bothers the Israelis, but it’s unlikely to work. A Turkish military intervention bothers them more. But, in the end, Iran is what worries them the most, and any sign that the Obama administration is reacting negatively to the Iranians, whatever the motives (and even if there is no clear motive), makes them happy. They want a deal on Shalit, but even if the price was high, this was not the time to get the United States focused on them rather than the Iranians. The Israelis might be prepared to go further in negotiations with Hamas if the United States focuses on Iran. And Hamas will go further with Israel if the Saudis tell them to, which is a price they will happily pay for a focus on Iran.

The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan

For the United States, there is another dimension to the Iran focus: Pakistan. The Pakistani view of the United States, as expressed by many prominent Pakistanis, is that the United States has lost the war against the Afghan Taliban. That means that any negotiations that take place will simply be about how the United States, in their words, will “retreat,” rather than about Pakistani guarantees for support against jihadists coupled with a U.S. withdrawal process. If the Pakistanis are right, and the United States has been defeated, then obviously, their negotiating position is correct.

For there to be any progress in talks with the Taliban and Pakistan, the United States must demonstrate that it has not been defeated. To be more precise, it must demonstrate that while it might not satisfy its conditions for victory (defined as the creation of a democratic Afghanistan), the United States is prepared to indefinitely conduct operations against jihadists, including unmanned aerial vehicle and special operations strikes in Pakistan, and that it might move into an even closer relationship with India if Pakistan resists. There can be no withdrawal unless the Pakistanis understand that there has been no overwhelming domestic political pressure on the U.S. government to withdraw. The paradox here is critical: So long as Pakistan believes the United States must withdraw, it will not provide the support needed to allow it to withdraw. In addition, withdrawal does not mean operations against jihadists nor strategic realignment with India. The United States needs to demonstrate just what risks Pakistan faces when it assumes that the U.S. failure to achieve all its goals means it has been defeated.

The Obama administration’s reaction to the alleged Iranian assassination plot is therefore a vital psychological move against Pakistan. The Pakistani narrative is that the United States is simply incapable of asserting its power in the region. The U.S. answer is that it is not only capable of asserting substantial power in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also that it is not averse to confronting Iran over an attempted assassination in the United States. How serious the plot was, who authorized it in Iran, and so on is not important. If Obama has overreacted it is an overreaction that will cause talk in Islamabad. Obviously this will have to go beyond symbolic gestures but if it does, it changes the dynamic in the region, albeit at the risk of an entanglement with Iran.

Re-evaluating the Region

There are many moving parts. We do not know exactly how far the Obama administration is prepared to take the Iran issue or whether it will evaporate. We do not know if the Assad regime will survive or what Turkey and Saudi Arabia will do about it. We do not know whether, in the end, the Egyptian regime will survive. We do not know whether the Pakistanis will understand the message being sent them.
What we do know is this: The crisis over Iran that we expected by the end of the year is here. It affects calculations from Cairo to Islamabad. It changes other equations, including the Hamas-Israeli dynamic. It is a crisis everyone expected but no one quite knows how to play. The United States does not have a roadmap, and neither do the Iranians. But this is a historic opportunity for Iran and a fundamental challenge to the Saudis. The United States has put some chips on the table, but not any big ones. But the fact that Obama did use rhetoric more intense than he usually does is significant in itself.
All of this does not give us a final answer on the dynamics of the region and their interconnections, but it does give us a platform to begin re-evaluating the regional process.

From the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: Rethinking the Region is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Between Piracy and Persia

In recent years, Somali piracy has been the greatest regional threat.

Mounting Threats to Maritime Chokepoints in the Middle East
07:52 GMT, September 23, 2011 Maritime chokepoints are among the most sensitive locations where geography, trade, and politics meet. The challenges posed by Middle Eastern chokepoints, in particular, were evident even before the massive dependence on oil of the twentieth century. These points have become increasingly volatile in recent years, and especially since the Arab uprisings began. Complications include increased regional instability and aggravation of existing threats, pre-eminently piracy, terrorism, and the challenges posed by Iran.

PIRACY AND TERRORISM AS GROWING CONCERNS

Though states’ interests vary and are sometimes in conflict with one another, all value unfettered shipping. In recent years, the greatest regional threat to this common interest in the Red Sea, has been Somali piracy (although not exclusively). Much has been undertaken to address this ongoing problem. International efforts and resources, including the deployment of European, American, NATO, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and other naval forces, coordinated commercial shipping movements, dedicated tracking and communications resources, and widespread adoption of anti-piracy practices have driven the attacks away from the Bab el-Mandab Strait further east along the Yemeni coast of the Indian Ocean (towards the Straits of Hormuz) and to the south of the Horn of Africa.[1]

Tactical measures have reduced (that is, displaced) the number of pirate attacks in the Red Sea in recent years. However, the strategic problem of failing states—of which piracy is only a symptom—may be getting worse at the sea’s two ends and in the middle. Somalia’s ongoing problems could prove to be just the tip of the iceberg. Current international anti-piracy efforts mainly target the symptom (i.e. attacks on the seas) and not the fundamental causes of the phenomenon.

Yemen has been racked by sectarian and tribal violence. In the last two years, it has become the adopted home of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This is similar to how the political and economic conditions in Somalia proved to be a breeding ground for both piracy and the Islamist terrorist group al-Shabaab. Recent reports suggest that AQAP has seized control of areas along the Yemeni coast. While Yemen’s instability predates the large-scale demonstrations that swept across the Arab world in early 2011, an increasingly chaotic Yemen could make the country ever more attractive as a base for Somali pirates, expanding their already thriving black market for weapons.

While instability in Yemen, or even its collapse, would not lead inevitably to increased piracy on the Red Sea, it is a distinct possibility. This potential, combined with the global importance of undisturbed shipping through the area, suggest that the stability, security, and prosperity of these states provide a distinct shared interest.

Egypt is also a concern when it comes to maritime chokepoints. While the effective management and smooth operation of the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline remain a clear Egyptian interest, the country at present is experiencing its greatest political challenge in over half a century. Egypt’s poverty and governance problems pale in comparison to those in Yemen and Somalia, and the country appears an unlikely source of Red Sea piracy. Yet, Egypt is struggling with a restive Bedouin population in the Sinai Peninsula. In May 2011, an Egyptian security official claimed that over 400 Bedouin, Palestinian, and foreign Arab members of al Qaeda were in the peninsula. While Egypt dedicates significant resources to securing the Suez Canal, it is possible that the canal or the SUMED pipeline could become targets for future attacks. An attack on either site could hinder global transportation. This is not just a theoretical concern. In 2009, Egyptian authorities arrested 26 people for planning to attack ships in the Suez Canal and oil pipelines.[2] The Sinai pipeline, which carries natural gas from Egypt to Israel and Jordan, and provides Israel with more than 40 percent of its natural gas supply primarily for electricity generation, has been sabotaged repeatedly in recent months.[3]

THE IRANIAN THREAT

Iran’s threats to close the Straits of Hormuz to international shipping and, thereby, stop the flow of Gulf oil have increased in frequency and intensity recently. Senior Iranian officials have warned explicitly that Iran can—and will—block the Straits in response to any act of aggression. In general, these pronouncements are intended to deter the international community from increasing pressure on Iran and to raise the perceived cost of any military confrontation with it, particularly against its nuclear facilities. Former commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s naval force, Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari, warned in 2010 that U.S. warships are easy prey for the Iranian navy. Iran also threatened to respond if its ships’ cargoes are subjected to inspections (a step included in a 2010 Security Council resolution on Iran). Iran ended the “Great Prophet 6” maneuvers in July 2011 by firing several supersonic coast-to-sea missiles against moving targets near the Hormuz Straits to demonstrate that the country is capable of disrupting, if not blocking, the Straits and will not hesitate to do so.[4]

Because of America’s military superiority in the Gulf, Iran has placed a priority on acquiring and building a large number of small, fast-moving vessels (some of which are for unmanned use). It also has re-outfitted civilian vessels for military missions. As a result, in recent years there have been reports of Revolutionary Guard naval vessels skirmishing with U.S. ships. These incidents were demonstrative, rather than destructive (the U.S. ships were not actually attacked). They were intended to send a message (“naval diplomacy”) to the United States—namely that Iran sees the Straits as its strategic backyard. In recent months, there have been several near misses between Iranian and American ships because of Iran’s increased military activity. Both sides appear uncomfortable with the rising tensions in the Straits, as evidenced by occasional talk that a “hot line” should be established between the two rivals.

Recent assessments suggest that the American Fifth Fleet is capable of opening the Straits to naval traffic within a few weeks, even if Iran were willing to sacrifice all of its assets, suffer massive retaliation, and potentially lose many of its own oil facilities and export revenues.[5] Such assessments may be based on the fundamental weakness of the Iranian air force, a belief in the American ability to paralyze Iranian positions near the Straits (where Iran stations its coastal defense cruise missiles), and America’s improved ability to remove naval mines. In addition, unlike other vessels such as cargo ships, tankers are hard to sink due to their size, structure, and the fact that crude oil doesn’t burn easily.

Even in the unlikely possibility that Iran could effectively close the Straits for a long period of time, such a move would not be in Iran’s best interests. It would interfere with the import of refined oil to Iran and its export of crude oil (which accounts for some 80 percent of its income). Also, it would undoubtedly lead to a confrontation with the U.S. Navy, which has a clear operational advantage. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates, the majority of Iran’s oil exports pass though the waterway.[6]

Yet, even a partial blockade of the Straits with rapid, effective international action to open them, would affect the already volatile global energy market. The impact of even a limited campaign on the market would likely last a long time, beyond the event itself, because of the residual concern about supply disruptions. In order to mitigate these negative effects, three options are available:

1) Tapping into strategic petroleum reserves, half of which are in the United States. In July 2011, because of the impact of the “Arab Spring” on oil prices, there was an international decision to release a limited quantity of oil from American, as well as other reserves.[7]
2) Taking advantage of excess global oil production capacity, which is primarily concentrated in Saudi Arabia. Saudi senior officials have claimed that the Kingdom can produce an additional four million barrels of oil per day, which approximately equals Iranian production capability.
3) Using alternate shipping routes, such as the Saudi East-West and the Habshan-Fujairah pipelines, which can carry up to 5 million and 1.5 million barrels, respectively, per day.

As discussed above, because of its fundamental military weakness, Iran is incapable of blocking the Straits completely for long. Therefore any conflict would focus on disrupting freedom of movement in the Gulf in general, while attempting to avoid a comprehensive campaign that might cost it dearly—militarily, politically, and economically.[8] Within these limits, Iran will continue to take advantage of the Straits’ unique geographical conditions and global sensitivity to tremors in the world’s energy market by threatening to close the Straits. This blustery threat continues to serve the regime well even if it appears contrary to its own basic interests.

That said, any confrontation might develop into a more widespread campaign, where both sides lose the ability to limit its scope in time and space. For example, Iranian harassment actions and U.S.-led counter-actions could precede an attack on the western shore of the Gulf, where there is strategic infrastructure, including ports, refineries, and desalination plants. This possibility undoubtedly would give pause to anyone considering a muscular response to Iran’s threats.

The Hormuz Straits are not the only point of maritime friction with Iran. The Red Sea is becoming an increasingly important Iranian-Israeli arena. Iran reportedly transports and even manufactures weapons in the Sudan to supply terrorist groups in Africa and the Middle East. According to U.S. sources, Israel, in turn, has dispatched its air force to attack Iranian weapons convoys headed for Hamas-controlled Gaza.[9] Israel is increasingly concerned that Iran has invested significant efforts in developing its relationships with several East African countries, including Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Tanzania, and the Comoro Islands. For Israel, this is reminiscent of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s initiatives in the 1960s that were intended to provide Egypt with greater ability to block Israeli shipping along the length of the Red Sea. In addition, as part of Iran’s high profile, regional muscle flexing, in 2011, it dispatched ships to the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal, and reportedly for the first time, sent submarines to the Red Sea.

The Iranian threat also has implications for the Black Sea region and the Turkish Straits. Already in 2007, there were reports that the United States might use air force bases in Bulgaria and on Romania’s Black Sea coast to launch an attack on Iran.[10] Recently, Russia complained about the presence of a U.S. Aegis cruiser with antimissile technology in the Black Sea as part of a joint U.S.-Ukrainian naval exercise.[11] The perceived need for deploying such technology on the European continent is an indication, in part, of the growing fear in the West of Iranian intentions because of the increased range of Iranian missiles.

CONCLUSION

Piracy, terrorism, and the growing threat from Iran are problems that the international community is trying to tackle collectively. These problems are not necessarily distinct, as Iran is trying to increase its influence in states with weakening governmental control such as Yemen, partly as result of the “Arab Spring.” Iran is also taking advantage of growing piracy to justify its increasing naval presence in the Red Sea vicinity. These Iranian efforts to project power have turned the waters around the Horn of Africa into another area of maritime friction. The result is that other navies operating in the area are now combating both piracy and Iranian weapon smuggling and muscle flexing.


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By Yoel Guzansky, Jonathan Schachter and Gallia Lindenstrauss
For Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) (Originally published at www.fpri.org)

Yoel Guzansky, Dr. Jonathan Schachter and Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss are research associates at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University. For a more detailed version of this issue, see “Power, Pirates, and Petroleum: Maritime Choke Points in the Middle East,” published in the July 2011 issue of the INSS Strategic Assessment


NOTES:
[1] The move eastward also reflects pirates’ ability to adapt and extend the distances at which they can operate. See Lauren Ploch et al, Piracy off the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), p. 1.
[2] Alaa Shahine and Alaric Nightingale, “Suez Canal Ships, Pipelines Were Plotters’ Targets,” Bloomberg, July 9, 2009,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPJCNKXydyAc
[3] Karl Vick, “The Sinai Gas Blast: Another Reason for Israeli Anxiety over Egypt,” Time, February 7, 2011,http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046573,00.html
[4] “Iran to test-fire new Supersonic Missiles,” PressTV July 4, 2011,http://www.presstv.ir/detail/187450.html; See also “Iran Tests Hitting Mobile Naval Targets with Hi-Tech Missile,” Fars News, July 6, 2011.http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9004151166
[5] Anthony Cordesman, Iran, Oil and the Strait of Hormuz (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 2007), p. 6,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf .
[6] Gawdat Bahgat, “Persian Gulf Security at the Turn of the Century: Opportunities and Challenges,” Defense Analysis 15, no. 1 (1999), p. 82.
[7] Dan Strumpf, “Oil Futures: Oil Plunges as IEA Plans to Tap Strategic Reserves,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110623-710876.html.
[8] Yoel Guzansky, “The Straits of Hormuz: Strategic Importance in Volatile Times,” INSS Insight No. 204, September 3, 2010,http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=4387
[9] Luis Martinez, “Exclusive: Three Israeli Airstrikes against Sudan,” ABC News, March 27, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2009/03/exclusive-three.html
[10] Rick Rozoff, “Black Sea Crisis Deepens as US-NATO Threat to Iran Grows,” Global Research, September 16, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15239
[11] “Russia Decries U.S. Antimissile Ship’s Presence,” Global Security Network, June 13, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110613_3406.php