Trainer Jets for Israel: From the Skyhawk, to the Master

 

A maintenance scandal has led Israel to conclude, after more than 40 years, that its remaining Skyhawk advanced trainers need replacement. McDonnell Douglas’ A-4 Skyhawk, aka. “Scooter,” is best known for its long and storied career as a carrier-based attack aircraft with the US Navy; Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] was flying one when he was shot down over North Vietnam. It also had a storied land-based career with the Israeli Air Force. Beginning in late 1967, the IAF used this simple, pilot-friendly aircraft as a versatile attack aircraft with surprising air-air teeth.

Israel’s induction of F-16s was a turning point for the Skyhawk, which declined in importance, but never vanished entirely from service. Some are in storage or used as specialty platforms, others have been sold or leased to private operators, and the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF Lead-In Fighter Training. So, what’s next? A $1 billion advanced trainer competition – and a major geo-political decision.

On Wings of Skyhawks: Service in Israel

IAF A-4N – note
extended tailpipe

The Skyhawk is a much-beloved jet in the Israeli Air Force. The little A-4’s surprising maneuverability was coupled with an equally surprising ability to take battle damage, making it a popular and reliable choice over several wars. The type was last used heavily in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli fleet took correspondingly heavy loses: of 102 aircraft lost, 53 were Skyhawks.

That war was not without its moments of distinction. In one engagement, an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk found itself facing 3 MiG-21s. The maneuverable little Skyhawk turned on them and brought 2 of them down, and was reportedly on the 3rd Fishbed’s tail when an IAF Mirage IIIC zipped through and blasted the MiG out of the sky. Per mission losses in 1973 were just 0.6%, a lower figure than the previous 1970 War of Attrition with Egypt.

Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall. When Israel began inducting F-16s, the A-4s began to take a back seat. Some did participate in the 1982 Lebanon War, and one even scored a MiG-17 kill. By that time, however, squadron migrations to the F-16 had already begun, and 33 of the Skyhawks had been sold to Indonesia. By the mid 1990s, almost all of Israel’s fighter squadrons had migrated, and 2000-2001 saw a handful of Israeli Skyhawks sold to corporate operators like BAE and ATSI.

A number of Israeli A-4E/H/N aircraft are currently stored at Ovda Air Base, some planes have been used as electronic warfare support aircraft, others have been sold or leased tocontractors like ATAC, and as noted earlier, the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF pilot training.

Flying Israeli Skyhawks required maintenance, which was being provided by the contractor Kanfei Tahzuka, via Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Unfortunately, the little plane that could appears to have finally met its match. A combination of time’s wear and questionable maintenance performance grounded Israel’s Skyhawk fleet – and are about to lead to a replacement buy.

IAF Replacement Candidates

IAF F-16B

Candidates to replace the aircraft reportedly included converted IAF early-model F-16Bs, Boeing’s license-produced T-45TS Goshawk used by the US Navy, Finmeccanica’s M346 variant of the Yak-130, andKorea’s supersonic T-50.

The F-16s were reportedly a low-ranking option, because of the difficulty of transitioning from a primary jet trainer like the Fouga Magister or its T-6A turboprop replacement. They did not make the shortlist.

The T-45 Goshawk would have offered a welcome boost for Boeing’s closing production line, and could have been purchased with American military aid dollars. The flip side is that the US Navy hasn’t invested in giving them secondary mission capabilities beyond their training role. This option didn’t make the shortlist, either.

T-45 Goshawks

Militarily, the chosen M346’s performance profile, and ordnance-carrying capability in a pinch, are probably the closest to the Skyhawk’s. Unlike its Russian Yak-130 counterpart, however, the M346 hasn’t been built and tested in a light attack version. Depending on how the Israelis chose to look at things, that could be seen as a disadvantage, or as a perceived opportunity. Beyond the military sphere, Finmeccanica has had to overcome doubts regarding Italy’s long-term political stability as a supplier, and its long-term economic stability as a customer. The latter is especially relevant, as future Italian purchases of Israeli equipment were the key to winning the deal. The Israelis believe that they have negotiated appropriate safeguards for that risk.

South Korea’s supersonic T-50 family offers the best aerodynamic performance of the 2 planes, and existing weapons integration gives it the ability to operate as an “F-16 Lite” beyond its training role. Israeli firms have made inroads into the Korean market with their UAVs and radars, and a wide variety of further orders beckon. A TA-50 order could have represented the next step for both countries, including Israeli cooperation toward a TA-50 with even broader light attack capabilities. Even without that, a T-50 buy would create the most capable military option for the IAF, while solving a problem for South Korea. An improved TA-50 trainer & light fighter would have the potential for significant ripple effects in the global arms market, and align Israel with their close supplier Lockheed Martin. That high potential upside would have come with a corresponding cost, however, as this would be Israel’s most expensive option.

A Geo-Political Decision

IAF Mirage IIIC:
A cautionary tale?

Israel’s finalist list narrowed its jet trainer options, but expanded the political considerations involved in the deal. In the end, those political and economic considerations may dominate the decision.

On the one hand, there’s South Korea. Israeli firms are cooperating with South Korea on a wide range of defense projects, from mini-UAVs to ballistic missile defense radars. The ROK is quietly emerging as a significant military export market for Israeli firms, and that cooperation has the potential to grow further, via South Korean interest in Iron Dome rocket interceptors and other products. Israel needs military exports to keep its military industries strong, and help lower prices for Israeli equipment. That means acquiring at least one new client per decade who looks… well, a lot like South Korea.

The T-50 Golden Eagle is an important national project for the Koreans. Their initial export sale to Indonesia took some of the pressure off, but they’re still very keen on exporting their jet to gain credibility abroad, and want to pick up momentum in America ahead of the USAF’s possible T-X decision. An Israeli “yes” would add credibility to their American ambitions, and would also help in places like Europe (vid. Poland). Israel is known as a careful buyer who insists on quality, and Israeli jets with offensive capabilities have good odds of gaining the coveted “combat proven” label. That, too, has value in the global market, especially when one of your jet’s key selling points is its high-end capabilities.

As the ROK ambassador has said, this relationship would survive an Israeli “no”. The arms it buys from Israel are needed, and there’s an unexpected cultural connection in South Koreathrough the Jewish Talmud, of all things. The question is whether the relationship would remain as strong. Or, whether other relationships might grow to supplant it. Turkey is currently South Korea’s biggest arms export customer, for instance, and its Ottomanist Islamic government is hostile to Israel. Indonesia became the first export buyer for the T-50, and followed that purchase by buying Daewoo-built U209 submarines. The United Arab Emirate is still seen as a possible destination for the T-50. Etc. If the bilateral relationship with Israel doesn’t keep growing, and defense relationships with countries hostile to Israel do keep growing, that’s likely to begin affecting South Korean foreign policies, as well as its defense ties.

Even if Israel does buy Korean, their experiences with France in the 1960s taught them that the risk of partner flips needs to be taken seriously. France went from Israel’s top weapon supplier to an arms embargo, as the country decided to seek favor and contracts with hostile Arab regimes instead. Lockheed Martin’s role as a co-bidder means that Israel needn’t worry about a T-50 embargo, as was the case with their Mirages – but Israel could conclude that a T-50 buy wouldn’t really change their future with South Korea.

Hydrocarbon rights

On the other hand, there’s Italy. Under former Prime Minister Berlusconi, relations were friendly, and Italy has been a supportive ally. Israel needs those in Europe, which is not a great future defense market, but is their main market for general economic exports. Europe becomes even more important following Israel’s discovery of huge gas fields off its Mediterranean coast. That gas must be exported, and Europe would be the destination. Currently, Russia and Turkey are key supply chokepoints for pipelines supplying Europe, though Italy’s pipeline to Algeria and Libya has some offsetting value. A pipeline through Turkey doesn’t make much sense for Israel, and even its plans to cooperate with Cyprus/Greece still leave Italy and Germany as next-step distribution hubs.

Berlusconi has stepped down, but even out of office, he will retain significant influence through Italy’s media. Israel will want long-term relations with Berlusconi, and Italy, to remain good. That could become tricky, given the European Left’s growing hostility toward Israel and Jews, but it’s not impossible. Berlusconi’s exit also helps somewhat, because it weakens the case for, and expectation of, a reward for long-standing ties.

On the other hand, Italy has reportedly taken steps to expand the potential deal, to include more wide-ranging trade and defense ties. A reported swap of M-346 trainers for Israeli AWACS jets is one way to strengthen those long-term ties, by making Israel both a high-profile export client, and the supplier of strategically important military hardware. The agreement also reportedly included joint development of satellite projects, and the sale of Israeli UAVs.

If reports in Ha’aretz are true, Israeli MoD Director-General Udi Shani inked a preliminary deal with his Italian counterpart in May 2011. Preliminary deals are subject to review, of course, and much has changed in the interim. On the other hand, the Israelis did announce the M-346 as their choice in February 2012. Which happened after consultations, bids, and deadlines to improve offsetting industrial packages, but without ever issuing a formal RFP.

Before the decision, DID wrote that:

“If Israel decides that their South Korean relationship is worth fighting for, the question may come down to whether or not they can find a way to keep the Italians close, and retain Berlusconi as a friend, while keeping the Koreans closer. If not, a hard choice lies ahead.”

Israel has taken a step toward that hard choice. For all anyone outside the process knows, the decision may have been made on straight economics, based on the countries’ respective industrial commitments. There are early indications, however, that the decision is not being seen that way in South Korea. What happens next will bear close scrutiny, extending far beyond the confines of a single jet deal.

Note: article from www.defenseindustrydaily.com

From the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: Rethinking the Region

By George Friedman
The territory between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush has been the main arena for the U.S. intervention that followed the 9/11 attacks. Obviously, the United States had been engaged in this area in previous years, but 9/11 redefined it as the prime region in which it confronted jihadists. That struggle has had many phases, and it appears to have entered a new one over the past few weeks.
Some parts of this shift were expected. STRATFOR had anticipated tensions between Iran and its neighboring countries to rise as the U.S. withdrew from Iraq and Iran became more assertive. And we expected U.S.-Pakistani relations to reach a crisis before viable negotiations with the Afghan Taliban were made possible.

(Click here to enlarge image)

However, other events frankly surprised us. We had expected Hamas to respond to events in Egypt and to the Palestine National Authority’s search for legitimacy through pursuit of U.N. recognition by trying to create a massive crisis with Israel, reasoning that the creation of such a crisis would strengthen anti-government forces in Egypt, increasing the chances for creating a new regime that would end the blockade of Gaza and suspend the peace treaty with Israel. We also thought that intense rocket fire into Israel would force Fatah to support an intifada or be marginalized by Hamas. Here we were clearly wrong; Hamas moved instead to reach a deal for the exchange of captive Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit, which has reduced Israeli-Hamas tensions.

Our error was rooted in our failure to understand how the increased Iranian-Arab tensions would limit Hamas’ room to maneuver. We also missed the fact that given the weakness of the opposition forces in Egypt — something we had written about extensively — Hamas would not see an opportunity to reshape Egyptian policies. The main forces in the region, particularly the failure of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the intensification of Iran’s rise, obviated our logic on Hamas. Shalit’s release, in exchange for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, marks a new stage in Israeli-Hamas relations. Let’s consider how this is related to Iran and Pakistan.

The Iranian Game

The Iranians tested their strength in Bahrain, where Shiites rose up against their Sunni rulers with at least some degree of Iranian support. Saudi Arabia, linked by a causeway to Bahrain, perceived this as a test of its resolve, intervening with military force to suppress the demonstrators and block the Iranians. To Iran, Bahrain was simply a probe; the Saudi response did not represent a major reversal in Iranian fortunes.

The main game for Iran is in Iraq, where the U.S. withdrawal is reaching its final phase. Some troops may be left in Iraqi Kurdistan, but they will not be sufficient to shape events in Iraq. The Iranians will not be in control of Iraq, but they have sufficient allies, both in the government and in outside groups, that they will be able to block policies they oppose, either through the Iraqi political system or through disruption. They will not govern, but no one will be able to govern in direct opposition to them.

In Iraq, Iran sees an opportunity to extend its influence westward. Syria is allied with Iran, and it in turn jointly supports Hezbollah in Lebanon. The prospect of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq opened the door to a sphere of Iranian influence running along the southern Turkish border and along the northern border of Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi View

The origins of the uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad are murky. It emerged during the general instability of the Arab Spring, but it took a different course. The al Assad regime did not collapse, al Assad was not replaced with another supporter of the regime, as happened in Egypt, and the opposition failed to simply disintegrate. In our view the opposition was never as powerful as the Western media portrayed it, nor was the al Assad regime as weak. It has held on far longer than others expected and shows no inclination of capitulating. For one thing, the existence of bodies such as The International Criminal Court leave al Assad nowhere to go if he stepped down, making a negotiated exit difficult. For another, al Assad does not see himself as needing to step down.
Two governments have emerged as particularly hostile to al Assad: the Saudi government and the Turkish government. The Turks attempted to negotiate a solution in Syria and were rebuffed by al Assad. It is not clear the extent to which these governments see Syria simply as an isolated problem along their border or as part of a generalized Iranian threat. But it is clear that the Saudis are extremely sensitive to the Iranian threat and see the fall of the al Assad regime as essential for limiting the Iranians.
In this context, the last thing that the Saudis want to see is conflict with Israel. A war in Gaza would have given the al Assad regime an opportunity to engage with Israel, at least through Hezbollah, and portray opponents to the regime as undermining the struggle against the Israelis. This would have allowed al Assad to solicit Iranian help against Israel and, not incidentally, to help sustain his regime.
It was not clear that Saudi support for Syrian Sunnis would be enough to force the al Assad regime to collapse, but it is clear that a war with Israel would have made it much more difficult to bring it down. Whether Hamas was inclined toward another round of fighting with Israel is unclear. What is clear is that the Saudis, seeing themselves as caught in a struggle with Iran, were not going to hand the Iranians an excuse to get more involved than they were. They reined in any appetite Hamas may have had for war.

Hamas and Egypt

Hamas also saw its hopes in Egypt dissolving. From its point of view, instability in Egypt opened the door for regime change. For an extended period of time, it seemed possible that the first phase of unrest would be followed either by elections that Islamists might win or another wave of unrest that would actually topple the regime. It became clear months ago that the opposition to the Egyptian regime was too divided to replace it. But it was last week that the power of the regime became manifest.

The Oct. 9 Coptic demonstration that turned violent and resulted in sectarian clashes with Muslims gave the government the opportunity to demonstrate its resolve and capabilities without directly engaging Islamist groups. The regime acted brutally and efficiently to crush the demonstrations and, just as important, did so with some Islamist elements that took to the streets beating Copts. The streets belonged to the military and to the Islamist mobs, fighting on the same side.
One of the things Hamas had to swallow was the fact that it was the Egyptian government that was instrumental in negotiating the prisoner exchange. Normally, Islamists would have opposed even the process of negotiation, let alone its success. But given what had happened a week before, the Islamists were content not to make an issue of the Egyptian government’s deal-making. Nor would the Saudis underwrite Egyptian unrest as they would Syrian unrest. Egypt, the largest Arab country and one that has never been on good terms with Iran, was one place where the Saudis did not want to see chaos, especially with an increasingly powerful Iran and unrest in Syria stalled.

Washington Sides with Riyadh

In the midst of all this, the United States announced the arrest of a man who allegedly was attempting, on behalf of Iran, to hire a Mexican to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States. There was serious discussion of the significance of this alleged plot, and based on the evidence released, it was not particularly impressive.
Nevertheless — and this is the important part — the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama decided that this was an intolerable event that required more aggressive measures against Iran. The Saudis have been asking the United States for some public action against Iran both to relieve the pressure on Riyadh and to make it clear that the United States was committed to confronting Iran alongside the Saudis. There may well be more evidence in the alleged assassination plot that makes it more serious than it appeared, but what is clear is that the United States intended to use the plot to increase pressure on Iran — psychologically at least — beyond the fairly desultory approach it had been taking. The administration even threw the nuclear question back on the table, a subject on which everyone had been lackadaisical for a while.
The Saudi nightmare has been that the United States would choose to reach an understanding with Iran as a way to create a stable order in the region and guarantee the flow of oil. We have discussed this possibility in the past, pointing out that the American interest in protecting Saudi Arabia is not absolute and that the United States might choose to deal with the Iranians, neither regime being particularly attractive to the United States and history never being a guide to what Washington might do next.
The Saudis were obviously delighted with the U.S. rhetorical response to the alleged assassination plot. It not only assuaged the Saudis’ feeling of isolation but also seemed to close the door on side deals. At the same time, the United States likely was concerned with the possibility of Saudi Arabia trying to arrange its own deal with Iran before Washington made a move. With this action, the United States joined itself at the hip with the Saudis in an anti-Iranian coalition.
The Israelis had nothing to complain about either. They do not want the Syrian regime to fall, preferring the al Assad regime they know to an unknown Sunni — and potentially Islamist — regime. Saudi support for the Syrian opposition bothers the Israelis, but it’s unlikely to work. A Turkish military intervention bothers them more. But, in the end, Iran is what worries them the most, and any sign that the Obama administration is reacting negatively to the Iranians, whatever the motives (and even if there is no clear motive), makes them happy. They want a deal on Shalit, but even if the price was high, this was not the time to get the United States focused on them rather than the Iranians. The Israelis might be prepared to go further in negotiations with Hamas if the United States focuses on Iran. And Hamas will go further with Israel if the Saudis tell them to, which is a price they will happily pay for a focus on Iran.

The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan

For the United States, there is another dimension to the Iran focus: Pakistan. The Pakistani view of the United States, as expressed by many prominent Pakistanis, is that the United States has lost the war against the Afghan Taliban. That means that any negotiations that take place will simply be about how the United States, in their words, will “retreat,” rather than about Pakistani guarantees for support against jihadists coupled with a U.S. withdrawal process. If the Pakistanis are right, and the United States has been defeated, then obviously, their negotiating position is correct.

For there to be any progress in talks with the Taliban and Pakistan, the United States must demonstrate that it has not been defeated. To be more precise, it must demonstrate that while it might not satisfy its conditions for victory (defined as the creation of a democratic Afghanistan), the United States is prepared to indefinitely conduct operations against jihadists, including unmanned aerial vehicle and special operations strikes in Pakistan, and that it might move into an even closer relationship with India if Pakistan resists. There can be no withdrawal unless the Pakistanis understand that there has been no overwhelming domestic political pressure on the U.S. government to withdraw. The paradox here is critical: So long as Pakistan believes the United States must withdraw, it will not provide the support needed to allow it to withdraw. In addition, withdrawal does not mean operations against jihadists nor strategic realignment with India. The United States needs to demonstrate just what risks Pakistan faces when it assumes that the U.S. failure to achieve all its goals means it has been defeated.

The Obama administration’s reaction to the alleged Iranian assassination plot is therefore a vital psychological move against Pakistan. The Pakistani narrative is that the United States is simply incapable of asserting its power in the region. The U.S. answer is that it is not only capable of asserting substantial power in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also that it is not averse to confronting Iran over an attempted assassination in the United States. How serious the plot was, who authorized it in Iran, and so on is not important. If Obama has overreacted it is an overreaction that will cause talk in Islamabad. Obviously this will have to go beyond symbolic gestures but if it does, it changes the dynamic in the region, albeit at the risk of an entanglement with Iran.

Re-evaluating the Region

There are many moving parts. We do not know exactly how far the Obama administration is prepared to take the Iran issue or whether it will evaporate. We do not know if the Assad regime will survive or what Turkey and Saudi Arabia will do about it. We do not know whether, in the end, the Egyptian regime will survive. We do not know whether the Pakistanis will understand the message being sent them.
What we do know is this: The crisis over Iran that we expected by the end of the year is here. It affects calculations from Cairo to Islamabad. It changes other equations, including the Hamas-Israeli dynamic. It is a crisis everyone expected but no one quite knows how to play. The United States does not have a roadmap, and neither do the Iranians. But this is a historic opportunity for Iran and a fundamental challenge to the Saudis. The United States has put some chips on the table, but not any big ones. But the fact that Obama did use rhetoric more intense than he usually does is significant in itself.
All of this does not give us a final answer on the dynamics of the region and their interconnections, but it does give us a platform to begin re-evaluating the regional process.

From the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: Rethinking the Region is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Foreign fighters support Israel's settlements

The Jewish Defence League has dispatched French "militants" for a "show of solidarity" in illegal West Bank settlements.

Two weeks ago, an announcement appeared on a French website, calling for "militants with military experience" to participate in a solidarity trip to Israel between September 19 and 25. "The aim of this expedition is to lend a hand to our brothers facing aggression from the Palestinian occupiers, and to enhance the security of Jewish towns in Judea and Samaria," it explained. The dates of the trip coincide with the Palestinian statehood bid at the United Nations.
As of yesterday, in response to this call, there were 55 French citizens, both men and women, with military experience, stationed inside the illegal Israeli settlements up and down the West Bank. Organised into five separate groups of 11, their mandate is to "defend the settlements against any attack from Palestinians", and to "aid" in areas where they feel there is a lack of Israeli army personnel or police forces.
The website belongs to the French chapter of the Jewish Defence League (JDL), a far-right Jewish group founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane in the United States in 1968. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has refered to the JDL as a "violent extremist organisation".
JDL in France
"In France, it is a movement made up of French citizens who defend the Jewish community when faced with aggression, and also defends Israel in a more general manner," said Amnon Cohen, a spokesperson for the group. “In terms of ideology, we are Zionists, pro-Israeli, and we share similar ideologies to that of the Ichud Leumi ["National Union"] party in Israel." The National Union advocates the settlement of Jewish people in the entirety of the occupied West Bank, which it calls by its biblical name of Judea and Samaria.
“People say we are extreme because we believe in Judea and Samaria, and that this belongs to the Israelis, the Jews, but I don't consider this to be extreme," he told Al Jazeera.
Cohen was quick to point out that the JDL, contrary to recent media reports, is not banned in Israel or the US, but in fact, has active chapters across the world, including the US, Canada, the UK and France.
“We are active, the authorities are aware of us, and we maintain good relations with them," he said.
Numerous examples of targeted attacks on pro-Palestinian entities, movements, and demonstrations across France by individuals associating with the JDL validate Cohen's statements.
Nicolas Shahshahani, manager of La Librarie Resistances, a bookstore located in a quiet neighbourhood of Paris, has been the victim of such aggression. The first attack occurred in December 2006 soon after the store's opening, when Shahshahani asked two Jewish authors, the late Tanya Reinhart and Aharon Shabtai to speak, both critics of Israeli policy in the occupied territories. Midway through the event, the bookstore was suddenly filled with tear gas, as a group of six masked people wearing helmets, and armed with iron bars entered and raided the store, shouting obscenities at the attendees. "They broke the windows, and I had to go to the hospital to get treatment for the teargas," Shahshahani told Al Jazeera. "We launched a complaint against the police, but of course there was no investigation."
In July 2009 the bookstore was targeted once again. Five people, who identified themselves as members of the JDL, poured litres of cooking oil all over the store and its books. "This is just as efficient as fire, if not more, if you want to damage a bookshop," explained Shahshahani.
That time, however, the perpetrators were taken to court, where they admitted guilt, and were given suspended prison terms plus made to pay civil damages.
Courts and convictions
In another case, about 20 JDL members assaulted four students from Nanterre University. The attack, in which one student had his facial bones broken, took place within the compounds of the Administrative Court of Paris. Only Anthony Attal, reputed to be head of the group at the time, was charged.
The spokesperson for the Nanterre student association, AGEN, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal attacks, was present when the beating took place. Forced to do their own investigation into the matter, the students presented the police with their evidence. "We had video footage that identified Attal as the perpetrator," he said, adding that as an association, AGEN - a Palestinian solidarity organisation - was regularly targeted by the JDL.
"When you spend many years attending these demonstrations, you start to recognise the faces of those who turn up and commit acts of aggression and intimidation, and then you see the same faces in court. It's not difficult to point out who belongs to the JDL," he said.
The court process to convict Attal was unusual, according to Dominique Cochain, the lawyer representing one of the victims. "The aggressor wasn't present in the court, neither was his lawyer, and the judge therefore took it upon himself to interrogate the victim for two hours, trying to make the victim say it was a fight rather than an act of aggression," essentially playing the role of the defence lawyer, she told Al Jazeera.
Since his conviction, Attal has been captured on video at several pro-Palestinian demonstrations, as recently as this summer.
"It gives the signal to others that there is a possibility to continue with this type of aggression, because it is not dealt with harshly," said Cochain. "In my opinion, there is a certain level of tolerance between the French authorities and this group."
Cochain, who has been defending victims of these aggressions since 2004, has also been a victim of intimidation. "I've been verbally abused and menaced because of the cases I do," she said. "They've called me the 'devil lawyer' and taken my photo," adding that she can identify them by the JDL logos they flash at her.
'Protecting the community'
Cohen, however, says any association between the attacks and the JDL are false. "These people say whatever they want against us, but it doesn't mean it's us doing it," he said.
Trying to connect members officially to the group is difficult to prove, due to the way organisations are structured in France. Registration would force the group to put out a manifesto and officially name members of its board. However, as registration is not obligatory, the JDL can exist without being registered, whereby membership is neither official nor public.
Cohen admitted the group was not registered under the name of the JDL, adding that it was registered under different names, "which are not important to know".
Some people claim that the police purposefully ignore unlawful acts of aggression purportedly carried out by the JDL. While Cohen denies this, he admits to having good relations with the authorities.
"Our adversaries say we work hand in hand with them, but we don't," he said. "We just divide the work. For example, if there is a protest we are involved in, the police secure the streets, and we secure the entrances."
"The police know that we are there to protect the community," he added.
French authorities referred Al Jazeera to the Ministry of Interior, who did not respond to an interview request.
'Violent youths'
The JDL encourages its members to undertake training in Krav Maga [Hebrew: "hand to hand combat"], a form of martial art used by the Israeli forces for close combat in urban warfare.
"We give this training to our members, so they are capable of defending themselves," Cohen explained.
Military training is also encouraged for its members. "I tell the members that they should do military service, and we encourage this," said Cohen, adding that some JDL members have been enrolled in the French army.
But AGEN says each of its demonstrations have been targeted by the JDL. "They hear about pro-Palestinian demonstrations, such as the Gaza flotilla solidarity events we had this summer, and they show up and start abusing people. It's not self-defence when they actively search for the demonstration," he said. "They hide in the streets when demonstrations happen, and attack the tail-end of the protests."
"We've asked for the dissolution of the JDL through a petition signed by 30 different associations, as they are an armed militia, which is forbidden in France," he said, but the petition has yet to gain traction with French authorities.
Ironically, prominent Jewish lobbies in France dissociate with the JDL, claiming they are groups of violent youth who do not represent the Jewish community.
Richard Prasquier, president of the Conseil Representatif des Institutions juives de France (CRIF), France's main Jewish lobby group, told Al Jazeera: "There are no relations between CRIF and the JDL, and I don't want anything to do with them."
Others remain unconvinced. "For years there have been calls for the government to dissolve the JDL, but they have done nothing because of CRIF," said Shahshahani. "On the street, when CRIF holds a public event, it's the JDL that provides the security in coordination with the French police."
Cohen confirmed what Shahshahani had said, adding: "Officially CRIF says they are separate from us, but there is the official position, and then there is reality. When there is something going on, they call us."
Sammy Ghozlan, a former police officer and president of the Bureau Nationnal de Vigilance Contre le Anti-semitisme(BNVCA), told Al Jazeera that they too "have no particular relationship with the JDL", although he was more understanding to the motives behind such actions.
"While the JDL are an extremist group, and not very well tolerated, their actions are a result of the discontent that exists, and this is continuing to grow," said Ghozlan. "Furthermore, the violence from the pro-Palestinian side is increasing, and the Jewish people are in despair."
'Very serious show of solidarity'
Referring to the current "mission" to Israel and the West Bank, the call for solidarity is being taken very seriously by the JDL. Cohen refused to give any personal details of his comrades in the settlements, as "it is not a show, but a serious gesture of solidarity. This is a serious trip; we've sent over people who are slightly older, with more experience, between the ages of 24 and 35", including three women.
"We know the IDF doesn't need us, but we"re going to show our solidarity. We're going over to make sure all areas are covered, and to defend the settlements," he said.
Pro-Palestinian activists such as Shahshahani say the call should be taken seriously. "They are publicly recruiting people with military experience, French citizens with military experience, to serve a foreign country with guns, what is this called?" he said. "We all know of people who were sent to Guantanamo, including French citizens, because of actions like these. What about the ones who aid the Israeli army?"


article from al- jazeera

FRANKLIN LAMB : WHY HEZBOLLAH WALKED

“ In case no one has noticed, the Obama administration just gifted Lebanon to Iran. Washington earlier presented Iraq,  Afghanistan, the Gulf,  and Pakistan. Could it be more clear that Iran’s strategic trump card is America’s subservience  to Israel?  For Iran, Israel’s strangle hold on the US government is the gift that keeps on giving.”  With this comment, my neighbor, Lebanese Human Rights Ambassador Ali Khalil, declared American hegemony in the region was on a slippery and descending slope and that yesterday’s political maneuvering in Lebanon likely accelerated American withdrawal .

My other neighbors in South Beirut appeared to go to bed early last night following the day’s events which saw the collapse of Lebanon’s US-Saudi and Israeli backed government. Some, like my American and Lebanese roommates were planning for quick evacuations  should our Hezbollah neighborhood-watch guys give us that special knock on the door. Two rapid raps and a shouted “Yalla!” (Let’s go) and it’s time to head north fast without looking back. The reason is because, like many here, some neighbors fear Israel might use this latest government crisis to invade Lebanon again.

Yesterday, our  “government” electricity (and internet) was cut from 10 a.m. until  2 p.m. and again from 6 p.m. to midnight.   At least ten hour daily power cuts is the norm south and north of the  pro-US/Saudi Hamra “chic” district, where three hours or less daily power cuts are experienced.  Spending lots of hours in candle light probably made the unsubstantiated rumors even more unsettling.  “The armed forces of Lebanon, Hezbollah and its allies, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Iran are on military alert. The Americans may send battalions from Iraq!”, The young man who works in the phone shop near my flat whispered. I could not help noticing that some of the young men normally hanging out in our hood seemed to have vanished. Even my phone card guy was impatient with me wanting to recharge my phone, “ please hurry”, he said, ”I have an appointment and need to close my shop.”

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

The current government crisis has its origins in the February 14, 2005 Valentine’s Day murder of Lebanon’s prime minister Rafic Hariri and 20 others.  The Bush administration declared Syria  responsible and saw an opportunity to force the Assad regime to drop its friendship with Washington’s  regional nemesis Iran, and to end its support for the National Lebanese Resistance led by Hezbollah.

One of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s State Department lawyers came up with the idea to use the  UN Security Council to set up a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to try Hariri’s killers and to hammer Syria into warming to Israel and to US projects for the region.

What was not considered at the time, but later became a godsend from the points of view of Israel and the Bush administration was  leaked STL  information claiming that Hezbollah members might also be involved in the assassination. Hardly believing, one imagines, their really good luck, Israel and the US abruptly changed directions and decided to use the newly formed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to rid themselves of Hezbollah once and for all as well as to correct Syria’s behavior, believing that the Syrian government would also be indicted.

The pressure on Hezbollah caused the party to condemn what it claims is  false witnesses and it strongly urged the Lebanese government to open a case against them and not allow the STL, which it and others believe has became fatally politicized  by  rushing to judgment,  to receive Lebanese government cooperation. Hezbollah’s  adversaries hailed the tribunal  even if Lebanon’s stability was endangered.  After nearly fourteen months of trying to get the Saad Hariri government to seriously reconsider its positions on the STL, the Hezbollah led opposition gave the majority an ultimatum either to call a cabinet meeting by January 12, 2011 to discuss the STL or the opposition Cabinet members would resign.  What Hezbollah and its allies wanted was for PM Hariri to convene a Cabinet session to consider whether to stop payment of Lebanon’s  49 percent share of the financing of the STL,  whether to withdraw the Lebanese judges from the tribunal, consider ending  all cooperation with the STL, and prosecuting  the “false witnesses” it claimed was linked to the UN probe into Rafik Hariri’s killing.

Under enormous pressure from Washington, Paris and Riyadh , Saad  balked.  The opposition quickly resigned. Under article 69 the Lebanese Constitution, the resignation of one-third plus one of Cabinet members automatically leads to the collapse of the 30-member government.  It was the first time in Lebanon’s politically turbulent history that a government collapsed under pressure of the resignations of one-third plus one of its members.

In order to secure the eleventh cabinet resignation, to add to Hezbollah’s ten, in order to bring down the pro-US government, Hezbollah Secretary General  Hassan Nasrallah’s  key political aide Hussein Khalil, called President Suleiman’s Cabinet designee, Sayyed Hussein.  Khalil reportedly conveyed Nasrallah’s greetings and his hope that Hussein would decide what to do based on his conscience.  Hussein’s resignation quickly followed and Hariri’s Premiership ended as he sat with President Obama at the White House.

What the toppling of the Hariri government means for the near term

Regional players reacted more or less predictably with the US accusing Iran, Syria and Hezbollah of ‘blackmail’, the French warning Syria that is would be held to account if there is  violence in Lebanon and the British warning of long term dangers. British Foreign Secretary William Hague said in a statement: “This is an extremely serious development which could have grave implications for Lebanon and for regional stability.”  One British diplomat added last this evening, “Good Grief, however can we resolve this problem anytime soon?”

Israeli Foreign Ministry officials said they were “carefully following events” in Lebanon following the resignations and that “The Lebanese understand that an attempt by extremist to disturb the peace may turn out as a perilous gamble,”  according to Israeli  TV Channel 10.  Israel is being accused today in Lebanon of trying to provoke strife and to gain advantage from the governmental crisis.  Yesterday after  kidnapping Sharbel Khoury, a shepherd from near Rmeish (he was released 24 hours later) the Israel navy also entered Lebanese waters along the coast.  This afternoon (1/13/10)  Israeli warplanes overflew Baalbek, Nabatiyeh and Marjayoun. These incursions constitutedIsrael’s 7,269 and 7,270^th violation of Lebanese sovereignty since the August 2006 adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 ordering it to stay out of Lebanon.  Several UNIFIL and UN protests have had no effect on Israel while Washington remains mute on the subject of Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty.

Free Patriotic Movement member and Hezbollah supporter  Jebran Bassil,  who was Minister of Energy until yesterday, blamed Washington for the fact that  Saudi-Syrian efforts to prevent the resignations, reached a dead end. “The other side bowed to external, especially American pressure, ignoring the advice and wishes of the Saudi and Syrian sides,” Bassil said.

For his part, Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid Jumblatt  seemed to agree with the FPM  and he attributed the failure of mediation efforts of Saudi Arabia and Syria to the “forces of darkness,” alluding to leading Western powers, “It appears the forces of darkness got involved and stymied the Syrian-Saudi initiative, through which we would have seen a blocking of the negative repercussion of the STL indictment.”

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea blamed the rival March 8 camp for seeking what he called “Stalin-like” powers, accusing it of “seeking to steal away the prerogatives of the president and the prime minister.”

What next for Hezbollah?

The Hezbollah led opposition, as a result of the last election, has a majority in the 128-member Parliament, which enables it to name a candidate of its own for prime minister during the president’s soon to be announced binding parliamentary consultations.  At noon on 1/13/10, Hezbollah voting bloc leader MP Mohammed Raad, announced that the opposition will name “a personality with a history of national resistance to head the new government.” Some are speculating that Hezbollah might propose the longtime Sunni leader Omar Karami, a moderate self effacing fellow with strong Syrian, progressive, and popular support.

Whatever it decides to do, Hezbollah may well take its time as its ponders major responsibilities that would envelope  the resistance movement should it decide to govern Lebanon. Some of its supporters are urging Hezbollah to accept the daunting challenge and implement its 2009 Manifesto and its recent election platforms and end the mafia like corruption among some Lebanon’s political leaders. Several Lebanese civil society NGO’s are urging Hezbollah to do more for Lebanon’s increasingly fragile environment, fix once and for all Lebanon’s serious water, electricity and infrastructure problems, and let the Lebanese public decide if Hezbollah  is true to their cause and warrants its future electoral support.

Others continue to  also lobby the party to immediately end Lebanon’s and the Arabs shame and grant Palestinian refugees the internationally mandated basic civil rights to work and to own a home. If Hezbollah heads the government, Palestinian prospects for achieving these elementary rights may be realized sooner rather than later.

Franklin Lamb is doing research in Lebanon and is reachable c/o fplamb@gmail.com