Showing posts with label t-50. Show all posts
Showing posts with label t-50. Show all posts

Saturday, November 23, 2013

50 Shades Of Sukhoi

by Bill Sweetman

T-50-5, fifth development aircraft in Russia's stealth fighter program, has turned up at the Zhukovsky flight test center in a new two-tone blue-grey paint scheme. 

blog post photo

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It looks a bit like an early-World War 2 US Navy scheme, the bane of a young model-builder because Humbrol paints were not formulated for easy merging. I don't think it has anything to do with a carrier-based T-50, however. 

Clearly, someone in Russia has been doing some thinking about visual camouflage - which, unlike radar camouflage, has not often been the subject of intense, consistent scientific study. A few years ago, the Su-35 appeared with a jagged dazzle pattern that recalled at World War 1 warship. 

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Like those schemes, and like some of the camouflage schemes that U.S. Navy Cdr. C.J. "Heater" Heatley developed with the aid of artist Keith Ferris, the aim is to deceive rather than to conceal. The idea of dazzle on ships, for example, was to make it hard for a submarine commander to discern how fast his target was going, or even in which direction. 

The T-50-5 scheme seems to be influenced by two theories of vision. First, at long distances, visual perception is dominated by monochrome: the eye can see colors but is cued by light and dark. Second, contrast is important to perception, and a sharp-edged object is seen most easily. Consequently, a grayish color is the best camouflage whether the background is earth or sky, and deliberately blurring edges makes the aircraft less visible. 

One engineer who had worked with Heatley, by the way, told me that the camouflage was too effective: the risk of collision during training was unacceptable. Another interesting observation is that it took a long time for anyone to realize that the most visible color in daylight is black. That's why RAF trainers are painted black. What about the F-117? It was painted black because when it was introduced, a senior USAF commander did not believe that it could survive in daylight, and consequently ordered the jets to be painted black to make sure nobody tried it. 

Saturday, February 18, 2012

Trainer Jets for Israel: From the Skyhawk, to the Master


 
A maintenance scandal has led Israel to conclude, after more than 40 years, that its remaining Skyhawk advanced trainers need replacement. McDonnell Douglas’ A-4 Skyhawk, aka. “Scooter,” is best known for its long and storied career as a carrier-based attack aircraft with the US Navy; Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] was flying one when he was shot down over North Vietnam. It also had a storied land-based career with the Israeli Air Force. Beginning in late 1967, the IAF used this simple, pilot-friendly aircraft as a versatile attack aircraft with surprising air-air teeth.
Israel’s induction of F-16s was a turning point for the Skyhawk, which declined in importance, but never vanished entirely from service. Some are in storage or used as specialty platforms, others have been sold or leased to private operators, and the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF Lead-In Fighter Training. So, what’s next? A $1 billion advanced trainer competition – and a major geo-political decision.
On Wings of Skyhawks: Service in Israel
Israeli A-4N
IAF A-4N – note
extended tailpipe
The Skyhawk is a much-beloved jet in the Israeli Air Force. The little A-4’s surprising maneuverability was coupled with an equally surprising ability to take battle damage, making it a popular and reliable choice over several wars. The type was last used heavily in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli fleet took correspondingly heavy loses: of 102 aircraft lost, 53 were Skyhawks.
That war was not without its moments of distinction. In one engagement, an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk found itself facing 3 MiG-21s. The maneuverable little Skyhawk turned on them and brought 2 of them down, and was reportedly on the 3rd Fishbed’s tail when an IAF Mirage IIIC zipped through and blasted the MiG out of the sky. Per mission losses in 1973 were just 0.6%, a lower figure than the previous 1970 War of Attrition with Egypt.
Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall. When Israel began inducting F-16s, the A-4s began to take a back seat. Some did participate in the 1982 Lebanon War, and one even scored a MiG-17 kill. By that time, however, squadron migrations to the F-16 had already begun, and 33 of the Skyhawks had been sold to Indonesia. By the mid 1990s, almost all of Israel’s fighter squadrons had migrated, and 2000-2001 saw a handful of Israeli Skyhawks sold to corporate operators like BAE and ATSI.
A number of Israeli A-4E/H/N aircraft are currently stored at Ovda Air Base, some planes have been used as electronic warfare support aircraft, others have been sold or leased tocontractors like ATAC, and as noted earlier, the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF pilot training.
Flying Israeli Skyhawks required maintenance, which was being provided by the contractor Kanfei Tahzuka, via Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Unfortunately, the little plane that could appears to have finally met its match. A combination of time’s wear and questionable maintenance performance grounded Israel’s Skyhawk fleet – and are about to lead to a replacement buy.

IAF Replacement Candidates

Israeli F-16B
IAF F-16B
Candidates to replace the aircraft reportedly included converted IAF early-model F-16Bs, Boeing’s license-produced T-45TS Goshawk used by the US Navy, Finmeccanica’s M346 variant of the Yak-130, andKorea’s supersonic T-50.
The F-16s were reportedly a low-ranking option, because of the difficulty of transitioning from a primary jet trainer like the Fouga Magister or its T-6A turboprop replacement. They did not make the shortlist.
The T-45 Goshawk would have offered a welcome boost for Boeing’s closing production line, and could have been purchased with American military aid dollars. The flip side is that the US Navy hasn’t invested in giving them secondary mission capabilities beyond their training role. This option didn’t make the shortlist, either.
T-45 Goshawks
T-45 Goshawks
Militarily, the chosen M346’s performance profile, and ordnance-carrying capability in a pinch, are probably the closest to the Skyhawk’s. Unlike its Russian Yak-130 counterpart, however, the M346 hasn’t been built and tested in a light attack version. Depending on how the Israelis chose to look at things, that could be seen as a disadvantage, or as a perceived opportunity. Beyond the military sphere, Finmeccanica has had to overcome doubts regarding Italy’s long-term political stability as a supplier, and its long-term economic stability as a customer. The latter is especially relevant, as future Italian purchases of Israeli equipment were the key to winning the deal. The Israelis believe that they have negotiated appropriate safeguards for that risk.
South Korea’s supersonic T-50 family offers the best aerodynamic performance of the 2 planes, and existing weapons integration gives it the ability to operate as an “F-16 Lite” beyond its training role. Israeli firms have made inroads into the Korean market with their UAVs and radars, and a wide variety of further orders beckon. A TA-50 order could have represented the next step for both countries, including Israeli cooperation toward a TA-50 with even broader light attack capabilities. Even without that, a T-50 buy would create the most capable military option for the IAF, while solving a problem for South Korea. An improved TA-50 trainer & light fighter would have the potential for significant ripple effects in the global arms market, and align Israel with their close supplier Lockheed Martin. That high potential upside would have come with a corresponding cost, however, as this would be Israel’s most expensive option.

A Geo-Political Decision

Mirage-III
IAF Mirage IIIC:
A cautionary tale?
Israel’s finalist list narrowed its jet trainer options, but expanded the political considerations involved in the deal. In the end, those political and economic considerations may dominate the decision.
On the one hand, there’s South Korea. Israeli firms are cooperating with South Korea on a wide range of defense projects, from mini-UAVs to ballistic missile defense radars. The ROK is quietly emerging as a significant military export market for Israeli firms, and that cooperation has the potential to grow further, via South Korean interest in Iron Dome rocket interceptors and other products. Israel needs military exports to keep its military industries strong, and help lower prices for Israeli equipment. That means acquiring at least one new client per decade who looks… well, a lot like South Korea.
The T-50 Golden Eagle is an important national project for the Koreans. Their initial export sale to Indonesia took some of the pressure off, but they’re still very keen on exporting their jet to gain credibility abroad, and want to pick up momentum in America ahead of the USAF’s possible T-X decision. An Israeli “yes” would add credibility to their American ambitions, and would also help in places like Europe (vid. Poland). Israel is known as a careful buyer who insists on quality, and Israeli jets with offensive capabilities have good odds of gaining the coveted “combat proven” label. That, too, has value in the global market, especially when one of your jet’s key selling points is its high-end capabilities.
As the ROK ambassador has said, this relationship would survive an Israeli “no”. The arms it buys from Israel are needed, and there’s an unexpected cultural connection in South Koreathrough the Jewish Talmud, of all things. The question is whether the relationship would remain as strong. Or, whether other relationships might grow to supplant it. Turkey is currently South Korea’s biggest arms export customer, for instance, and its Ottomanist Islamic government is hostile to Israel. Indonesia became the first export buyer for the T-50, and followed that purchase by buying Daewoo-built U209 submarines. The United Arab Emirate is still seen as a possible destination for the T-50. Etc. If the bilateral relationship with Israel doesn’t keep growing, and defense relationships with countries hostile to Israel do keep growing, that’s likely to begin affecting South Korean foreign policies, as well as its defense ties.
Even if Israel does buy Korean, their experiences with France in the 1960s taught them that the risk of partner flips needs to be taken seriously. France went from Israel’s top weapon supplier to an arms embargo, as the country decided to seek favor and contracts with hostile Arab regimes instead. Lockheed Martin’s role as a co-bidder means that Israel needn’t worry about a T-50 embargo, as was the case with their Mirages – but Israel could conclude that a T-50 buy wouldn’t really change their future with South Korea.
MoNI Map
Hydrocarbon rights
On the other hand, there’s Italy. Under former Prime Minister Berlusconi, relations were friendly, and Italy has been a supportive ally. Israel needs those in Europe, which is not a great future defense market, but is their main market for general economic exports. Europe becomes even more important following Israel’s discovery of huge gas fields off its Mediterranean coast. That gas must be exported, and Europe would be the destination. Currently, Russia and Turkey are key supply chokepoints for pipelines supplying Europe, though Italy’s pipeline to Algeria and Libya has some offsetting value. A pipeline through Turkey doesn’t make much sense for Israel, and even its plans to cooperate with Cyprus/Greece still leave Italy and Germany as next-step distribution hubs.
Berlusconi has stepped down, but even out of office, he will retain significant influence through Italy’s media. Israel will want long-term relations with Berlusconi, and Italy, to remain good. That could become tricky, given the European Left’s growing hostility toward Israel and Jews, but it’s not impossible. Berlusconi’s exit also helps somewhat, because it weakens the case for, and expectation of, a reward for long-standing ties.
On the other hand, Italy has reportedly taken steps to expand the potential deal, to include more wide-ranging trade and defense ties. A reported swap of M-346 trainers for Israeli AWACS jets is one way to strengthen those long-term ties, by making Israel both a high-profile export client, and the supplier of strategically important military hardware. The agreement also reportedly included joint development of satellite projects, and the sale of Israeli UAVs.
If reports in Ha’aretz are true, Israeli MoD Director-General Udi Shani inked a preliminary deal with his Italian counterpart in May 2011. Preliminary deals are subject to review, of course, and much has changed in the interim. On the other hand, the Israelis did announce the M-346 as their choice in February 2012. Which happened after consultations, bids, and deadlines to improve offsetting industrial packages, but without ever issuing a formal RFP.
Before the decision, DID wrote that:
“If Israel decides that their South Korean relationship is worth fighting for, the question may come down to whether or not they can find a way to keep the Italians close, and retain Berlusconi as a friend, while keeping the Koreans closer. If not, a hard choice lies ahead.”
Israel has taken a step toward that hard choice. For all anyone outside the process knows, the decision may have been made on straight economics, based on the countries’ respective industrial commitments. There are early indications, however, that the decision is not being seen that way in South Korea. What happens next will bear close scrutiny, extending far beyond the confines of a single jet deal.
Note: article from www.defenseindustrydaily.com

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Korea’s T-50 Family Spreads Its Wings

Korea’s defense industry is advancing on all fronts these days. On the armored vehicle front, vehicles like the XK2 tank and K9/K10 self propelled howitzer are beginning to win export orders, and its XK-21/KNIFV amphibious infantry fighting vehicle may not be too far behind. All fill key market niches, promising performance at a comparatively inexpensive price. Its shipbuilding industry, one of the world’s busiest, is beginning to turn out LHDs, and December 2008 saw its first-of-class KDX-III AEGIS destroyer accepted into service on time and on budget. Now its aerospace industry is in flight abroad with the already-exported KT-1 trainer. Not to mention a clever entry into the global trainer and light fighter markets.
Enter the T-50 Golden Eagle family, which offers a supersonic high-end trainer and lightweight fighter aircraft at an attractive price. The aircraft is hitting the international market just as many of the world’s jet training fleets are reaching ages of 30 years or more, and high-end fighters are pricing themselves out of reach for many countries. The TA-50 LIFT variant and FA-50 lightweight fighter are especially attractive as lightweight export fighters, and the ROKAF’s own F-5E/F Tiger II and F-4 Phantom fighters are more than due for replacement. Now the key question for the platform is whether it can find corresponding export sales…

T/F/A-50: The Planes

T-50 Underside
T-50, 3-view
(click to view full)
The T-50 was developed by Korea Aerospace Industries, Ltd., with cooperation and global marketing support from Lockheed Martin. Both firms were aware that many training aircraft fleets are aging, even as higher-performance fighters demand trainer aircraft that can keep up. The Korean government needed a fleet of trainers, and saw an opportunity to give their aerospace sector a strong boost in the process. Total investment in the T-50’s RDT&E program amounted to more than $2 billion: 70% from the Korean government, 17% from KAI, and 13% from Lockheed Martin.
With a length of 43 feet and a wingspan of 30 feet, the 2-seat T-50 is about 4 feet shorter than the F-16; overall, it’s only about 80% of the F-16’s size. The relative size of the control surfaces and tails are larger, however, to improve handling characteristics at lower speeds and make the aircraft easier to land. Larger landing gear is also fitted, to absorb harder landings, which is to be expected from student pilots. Its form’s resemblances to Lockheed Martin’s F-16 are suggestive, and include the blended mid-set wing, complete with leading-edge root extensions and rear ‘shelf’ fairings ending in F-16-style split airbrakes. The air intake layout on the sides is somewhat similar to the F/A-18 Hornet or Northrop’s excellent but ill-fated F-20A Tigershark, and the aircraft is powered by the same engine: GE’s popular, reliable and fuel-efficient F404, with slight improvements over the F404-GE-402 to enhance single-engine redundancy and reliability.
The T-50 trainer carries a basic navigation / attack system, which gives it some multi-role capability. The aircraft can carry Sidewinder missiles on the wingtips, as well as fuel, rockets, or qualified bombs on its 5 underwing and center pylons. the center pylon and 2 inner underwing pylons are “wet,” and can accommodate 150 gallon fuel drop tanks.
The T-50 family’s empty weight is 14,000 pounds, and maximum takeoff gross weight is 29,700 pounds; the F404-GE-102 engine produces 17,700 pounds of thrust. Maximum rate of climb is 39,000 feet per minute; and the maximum speed is Mach 1.5. Service ceiling is 48,500 feet, the design load factor is 8gs, and the trainer airframe is designed for up to 10,000-hour service life (8,344 hours for the A-50).
T-50 Cockpit
T-50 cockpit
(click to view full)
Still, the plane is designed to be a trainer, with better rear visibility than a 2-seat F-16. An “active stick” ensures that stick movements in the front or rear are transmitted to the stick in the other seat, to improve monitoring and learning. Embedded training features, in-flight recording and post-mission debriefing capability are all built in. The standard tools of a modern fighter pilot’s trade are likewise present: “glass cockpit” of digital screens, HUD (Head Up Displays), HOTAS (Hands On Stick And Throttle) control systems to keep everything at the pilot’s fingertips, triple-redundant electrical system, fly-by-wire, advanced radio and navigation systems including INS/GPS, and a Martin-Baker zero-zero ejection seat. The seat back angle is 17 degrees – similar to the seat angles of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-22.
Per the standards for modern trainers, the aircraft is part of a larger, integrated training system that includes simulators, computer-based training, cockpit and maintenance trainers, and a training management system.
Maintenance has also received careful thought. The new trainer’s airframe will require no mandatory depot maintenance, and the aircraft boasts a “single-tier design” with some 250 access panels allowing technicians to get at any major system without having to remove any others. Extensive self-diagnostics will help keep maintenance costs down.
All in all, the T-50 may remind some people of the F-16 that was originally designed by the “Fighter Mafia” back in the 1970s, when they were busy breaking every big-jet, multi-role, high-priced rule the USAF had cultivated for over a decade. Its thrust/weight ratio ensures that it’s no F-16; even so, 25 years after the F-16 was entering service, it retains one more comparison point: a similar price point in absolute dollars. A $20 million price point in the modern era places it firmly on the high end for a trainer, but its supersonic performance and versatility could still make the T-50 very popular indeed.
Key market competitors include the subsonic BAE Hawk, Aermacchi’s now-supersonic M346, and its Russian twin the Yak-130.
T-50B Golden Eagle
T/A-50 LIFT
(click to view larger)
At present, 3 variants of the T-50 are planned, beyond the basic T-50 trainer aircraft.
One is the T-50B aerobatic variant, which has replaced the ancient A-37 Dragonflys flown by South Korea’s “Black Eagles” national aerobatic team.
The 2nd is the TA-50 lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) variant. It adds Lockheed Martin’s AN/APG-67v4 multi-mode radar, derived from the radar that equipped Northrop’s F-20 Tigershark. It also has provisions for radar warning receivers and specialty pods, sports a 3-barreled M61 20mm cannon, and can carry Sidewinder air-air missiles, rocket pods, AGM-65 Maverick missiles, and Mk80 family bombs. If the specialty pods have surveillance and targeting capabilities, it is likely that laser-guided bombs and rockets could be added to their arsenal.
A slightly more expensive variant called the F/A-50 will be fitted for the lightweight fighter and light attack roles, and can also serve in the lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) role alongside the TA-50. It will have a wider range of equipment, but is hobbled by a key limitation.
The F/A-50 is also a joint KAI/ Lockheed Martin project, and the associated agreements includes a number of restrictive terms. One is that Lockheed will not transfer aircraft source code to other nations. Another is that the T-50’s capabilities cannot exceed Korea’s F-16s, though proposals to give the KF-16s AESA radar retrofits could break that logjam. A 3rd provision banned South Korea from integrating T-50 variants with non-U.S. technology that the United States doesn’t have.
Instead of Selex Galileo UK’s Vixen 500E AESA radar, therefore, the first F/A-50s will use IAI’s popular EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar, installed by Lockheed Martin. It will be coupled to additional datalinks like Link-16, a weapons management system, radar warning receivers, and a MIL-STD-1760 databus. FA-50s will also be able to carry additional electronic countermeasures equipment, and specialty pods like LITENING or Sniper ATP for targeting, surveillance, etc. Weapons will include the same lightweight 3-barreled M61 20mm gun, AIM-9 Sidewinder air-air missiles, rockets, Mk80 family bombs, and AGM-65 Maverick missiles carried by the TA-50. The enhanced radar, databus, and related systems will expand the FA-50’s range of potential weapons by adding the ability to carry GPS-guided weapons like JDAM bombs, WCMD/SFW cluster bombs, JSOW glide bombs, etc. They’re also likely to enable the addition of AIM-120 AMRAAM air-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and other advanced armaments.
Any FA-50 exports to Arab countries would have to use the AN/APG-67v4 radar and Sniper-SE surveillance and targeting pod from Lockheed, however, as the Israeli-designed radar and LITENING pods will not be an option. As advanced AESA radars become more mainstream in the global military market, the lack of an AESA option is also likely to cost the F/A-50 orders, unless KAI and Lockheed Martin come to an agreement. Proposals to upgrade the ROKAF’s KF-16s with AESA radars could offer a way out of the impasse.

T/F/A-50: The Program

Customers: ROKAF (102), Indonesia (16).
Key Prospects: USA, Israel, Poland.
Losses: Singapore, UAE (?)
  • Jan. 2012: ROKAF FA-50 order?
  • May 2011: Indonesia win.
  • Jan. 2011: TA-50 production rollout.
  • Sep. 2010: Singapore loss.
  • Sep. 2009: IAI’s EL/M-2032 radar deal for FA-50/TA-50.
  • Apr. 2009: ROKAF’s aerobatic Black Eagles switch to T-50B.
  • Feb. 2009: UAE loss (?)
  • Dec. 2008: Development contract for FA-50.
  • Dec. 2006: ROKAF order #2, for T-50s and TA-50s
  • Jan. 2006: T-50 development done, 1st 2 delivered.
  • Feb. 2003: T-50 goes supersonic for 1st time.
  • Oct. 1997: Development program authorized by ROK.
  • 1992: Conceptual design begins.
T-50 cutaway
T-50 cutaway, KAI
(click to view full,
scaled to fit page)
KAI is the T-50’s prime contractor, and is responsible for the design of the fuselage and tail unit, final assembly of the aircraft, and design of the accompanying training systems. The mid-mounted variable camber wings are manufactured by Lockheed Martin, who is also responsible for the avionics and fly-by-wire flight control system, and provides technical consulting.
The production line at Saechon is designed for a 1.5-aircraft-per-month production capability with a single shift, but the assembly process can produce up to 2.5 aircraft per month by simply adding another shift if orders increase. Man Sik Park, director of the T-50 management team at Sacheon, adds that “Getting more customers than our line can currently handle is no problem because we can increase the production rate further with additional tools and assembly jigs.”
TA-50
TA-50 drops tank
(click to view full)
The ROKAF already has production orders for 102 of KAI’s aircraft: 50 T-50 trainers, 22 TA-50 LIFT/ light fighters (with an option for another 22), 10 T-50B aerobatic aircraft that replaced the Black Eagles’ A-37 Dragonflys, and 20 FA-50s. Further domestic orders may follow in 2013 for 40-110 more upgraded FA-50 variants, to replace the RoKAF’s F-5 Tiger II and F-4 Phantom fighters.
Outside South Korea, Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems and KAI have created the T-50 International Company (TFIC) to pursue export markets. Indonesia (16 TA-50/T-50i) remains the only export customer so far.
The FA-50 in particular will offer performance that competes favorably with likely competitors such as the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and India’s Tejas LCA. All 3 of these jets are likely to find themselves competing in the niche once occupied by a pair of 1960s-1970s era competitors – Russia’s MiG-21s, and Northrop’s amazingly popular F-5, which still flies with the ROKAF. Both aircraft types are still flying in many air forces, and both are reaching the end of their lifespan. Hence the market opportunity. Unlike its Chinese and Indian competitors, however, the F/T/A-50 family’s secondary fighter trainer role makes it attractive to first and second world air forces as well.

Note: article from www.defenseindustrydaily.com

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Stealthy Chinese J-20 Vulnerable

China’s newest combat aircraft prototype, the J-20, will require an intense development program if it is going to catch up with fast-moving anti-stealth advances.
In fact, anti-stealth will bring into question all stealth designs: How much invulnerability will current low-observability techniques offer as air defense systems adopt larger and more powerful active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars? From the early days of AESA development, a key goal was to build a radar that could detect very small objects—such as a cruise missile at a distance great enough to target and shoot it down—or a larger object like a fighter with a very low-observable treatment.
Airborne detection of stealth aircraft may already be an operational capability. In a series of tests at Edwards AFB, Calif., in 2009, Lockheed Martin’s CATbird avionics testbed—a Boeing 737 that carries the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s entire avionics system—engaged a mixed force of F-22s and Boeing F-15s and was able to locate and jam F-22 radars, according to researchers. Raytheon’s family of X-band airborne AESA radar—in particular, those on upgraded F-15Cs stationed in Okinawa—can detect small, low-signature cruise missiles.
Moreover, Northrop Grumman’s lower-frequency, L-band AESA radar on Australia’s Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft is larger and potentially more capable of detecting stealth aircraft at longer ranges.
Lockheed Martin also hinted at a JSF anti-stealth capability in 2009 in a reference to combat with sophisticated, foreign aircraft. “The F-35’s avionics include onboard sensors that will enable pilots to strike fixed or moving ground targets in high-threat environments, day or night, in any weather, while simultaneously targeting and eliminating advanced airborne threats,” said Dan Crowley, then-executive vice president and F-35 program general manager.
Better images emerging from China point clearly to the J-20’s use of stealth technology, but major uncertainties and questions remain unresolved.
The overall shape resembles that of the F-35 and F-22, which have a single “chine line” uniting the forebody, upper inlet lips, and wing and canard edges with a curved surface above that line and flat, canted body surfaces below it. The wing and canard edges are aligned: The wing and canard leading edges are parallel and the trailing edge of each canard is aligned with the opposite wing’s trailing edge. The same basic philosophy also has been adopted in British, Swedish and Japanese studies for stealth fighters.
The aim in all cases is to endow a practical, agile fighter configuration with a “bow-tie” radar signature, with the smallest signature around the nose and the greatest (still much lower than that of a conventional aircraft with curved or vertical-slab sides) to the side. The fighter’s mission planning system, using a database of known radar locations, then derives a “blue line” track that weaves between radars and avoids exposing the side-on signature to those radars more than transiently.
The “diverterless” supersonic inlet avoids a signature problem caused by a conventional boundary layer diverter plate. For example, the F-22 has a conventional inlet, which is likely to require extensive radar absorbent material (RAM) treatment.
The biggest uncertainty about the Chinese design concerns the engine exhausts, which as seen on the prototype are likely to cause a radar cross-section (RCS) peak from the rear aspect. One possibility is that a stealthier two-dimensional nozzle will be integrated later in the program; however, the nozzles on the current aircraft show some signs of RCS-reducing sawtooth treatment, suggesting that the People’s Liberation Army has accepted a rear-aspect RCS penalty rather than the much greater weight and complexity of 2D nozzles.
Other features are less clear. Stealth development has been dogged by detail-design challenges. All the antennas on the aircraft have to be flush with the skin and covered with surfaces that retain stealth properties while being transparent in a specific frequency. Maintainability becomes a complex tradeoff: Some systems requiring frequent attention will be accessed via landing gear and weapon bays, and others by latched and actuated doors that can open and close without affecting RCS—but the latter involves a weight penalty.
Perhaps the toughest hurdle is managing radio-frequency surface currents over the skin. Early stealth designs used heavy, maintenance-intensive RAM. The F-22 introduced a much lighter surface treatment, but it has proven unexpectedly difficult to maintain, causing corrosion issues. Lockheed Martin now asserts that the F-35 will be robust and affordable to maintain in service, with a combination of a high-toughness, sprayed-on topcoat and a conductive layer cured into composite skin panels.
The Chengdu J-20 design has struck many analysts and observers as familiar and somewhat different from the F-22, F-35 or Sukhoi T-50.
“The J-20 is reminiscent of the Russian MiG-1.42 both in terms of planform and also with regard to the rear fuselage configuration,” says Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The most obvious difference is the greater forward fuselage shaping as the basis for low-observable characteristics, along with the different engine intake configuration. The MiG program was canceled by the Russian government around 1997,” he notes. However, the similarity to the MiG concept may suggest some collusion with the Russian aviation industry.
The J-20 made its first flight shortly before 1 p.m. Beijing time on Jan. 11. The flight ended three weeks of anticipation that began in late December when the new design started taxi tests.
The discussion about the program will now shift to the aircraft’s mission (fighter or, more likely, long-range strike), sensors (strike missions would require a high-resolution, long-range radar) and communications (which would demand high-speed data links and sophisticated integration).
Conventional radars have only one-half to one-third of the range of an AESA radar. Moreover, the movement of a conventional, mechanically scanned radar antenna provides a tell-tale glint of radio-frequency reflections to enemy aircraft with advanced radars. Such reflections undercut the effectiveness of a stealth airframe. China is known to be pursuing newer radar technology.
“It’s too early to tell the true status of the Chinese AESA program,” says a Washington-based intelligence official. “We’ve seen lots of press and air show information on the program, but that doesn’t automatically translate into a robust development or give us an accurate look at where [China] is as far as fielding one anytime soon.
“Like the [high-performance] engine, it’ll be a challenge to take the step from older radars to one designed for a fifth-generation fighter,” he says. “Again, though, the J-20 is just the first or second—depending on whom you believe—prototype in a very long development program.”
If the Chinese conduct a few months of flight tests and there are no more aircraft involved in the program, this might indicate that the J-20 is a proof-of-concept or technical demonstrator. If there are several aircraft eventually, a prototype program would be a more likely conclusion.
The flight occurred during a visit to China by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who says Chinese President Hu Jintao confirmed the event to him in talks. However, Gates still believes the U.S. will retain a preponderance of stealth fighters through 2025.
Photo Credit: Internet via Airpower Australia