Monday, November 19, 2012

Japan Aims To Launch F-3 Development In 2016-17


By Bradley Perrett


Sometime around 2030, if U.S. Air Force plans come to pass, a fighter that leaps ahead of Lockheed Martin F-22 and F-35 technology will enter U.S. service. At about the same time, if Japan's plans come to pass, a similarly advanced fighter will enter service on that side of the Pacific.

It might be the same fighter. Merging Japan's 2030s requirement into evolving U.S. plans for post-F-35 fighters seems to make great industrial sense. Japan plans to begin developing a homegrown fighter within five years, with the aim of beginning production under the designation F-3 around 2027. The defense ministry wants to lay the groundwork to go its own way by investing in stealth technology and building its own powerful fighter engine.
IHI Corp. is to develop a technology-demonstrator engine of 15 metric tons (33,000 lb.) thrust, according to an official document seen by Aviation Week.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is already building a small airframe technology demonstrator, the ATD-X Shinshin, which the ministry expects to test in the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2014. Mitsubishi Heavy is also very likely to build the F-3, which Japanese officials expect will carry a pilot.

Full-scale development would begin in 2016 or 2017 and the first prototype would fly in 2024-25, according to the ministry's plans. Series production is to begin in 2027 and the type would begin replacing Mitsubishi Heavy Industries F-2 strike fighters in the first half of the 2030s. In the second half of that decade it would begin replacing Boeing F-15Js. The F-15s are older but are likely to remain the mainstay of Japan's air-defense squadrons, with suitable upgrades (see following article).

The exact status of the ministry's plans is unclear, but they probably represent what it hopes to achieve, with some expectation of obtaining approval. It projects production of about 200 F-3s, which would follow the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning into Japanese service. Japan has decided to buy 42 F-35s and may build parts of them. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force tentatively plan to begin fielding new fighters in 2030-35, the former sometimes using the name F/A-XX and the latter referring to its proposed F-X.

Two years ago, the ministry disclosed a research effort for what it called the i3 Fighter, intended to assemble a suite of advanced technologies for a future combat aircraft—or, some suspect, to be offered to the U.S. as a Japanese contribution to the next U.S. fighter. The ministry's Technical and Research Development Institute is leading the i3 Fighter work.

The ministry's plans are evidently firming up, and broadly match a road map for fighter development set out by Japanese industry in 2010. The industry proposal, though, included production of an imported aircraft—now determined to be the F-35—until 2028. While production of the confirmed batch of F-35s, which will replace F-4EJ Kai Phantoms, could not feasibly be stretched until 2028, it is possible that some F-15s could be replaced earlier by additional F-35s before F-3s replace the rest.

The power of the IHI demonstrator engine is surprising. It would generate 50% more thrust than the General Electric F414, two of which power the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The Super Hornet's thrust is not notably high for its empty mass, 14.6 tons (32,100 lb.), but in a twin-engine installation the output of the IHI demonstrator would be abundant for a larger, budget-straining aircraft. It does seem that Japan is looking for a twin aircraft: In a single installation, the engine would be adequate for only a modestly sized fighter, hardly suitable as an F-15 replacement.

Japan has discussed plans for such an engine for some time, but the specific thrust and intention to build a full-scale demonstrator have not been disclosed. Japanese industry revealed a drawing of the engine last year, showing that it would follow the general configuration of the Pratt & Whitney F119 and have a sophisticated arrangement of inlet vanes designed to disrupt radar reflections (AW&ST Feb. 14, 2011, p. 33). In its budget request for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2013, the ministry has published drawings of three of the engine's modules: fan, high-pressure section and the low-pressure turbine.

The key goal of the engine program is to build an unusually slim turbofan. The low frontal area and the modest bypass ratio evident in drawings would both promote the ability to fly supersonically without afterburner. So would the generous thrust, although 33,000 lb. must be the afterburning rating; the maximum dry output is unknown.
Researchers are aiming to achieve the highest possible temperature at the inlet to the high-pressure turbine, the ministry says in its budget request. They can already achieve 1,600C (2,900F) but want to go higher during the study program, while also reducing engine weight, it says. Mitsubishi Heavy said last year it had achieved a 1,600C turbine inlet temperature, the highest ever, for an electricity-generating engine to be installed in a power station.

Previously disclosed elements of the Japanese engine research include single-crystal turbine rotor blades, stator blades made of ceramic matrix composite (a ceramic reinforced with carbon fiber) and an advanced combustor.
The proposed budget for the fighter engine development is ¥17.2 billion ($218 million), of which ¥4.5 billion would be spent in fiscal 2013. Research would run until fiscal 2017. From fiscal 2015, there would be “testing,” which may mean running the demonstrator.

A Japanese engine would not be needed if the F-3 program were merged into a U.S. fighter program, as industry executives suspect it will, since the U.S. would certainly supply its own powerplant. But by developing an engine, Japan will retain the freedom to power its own fighter should it not come to an agreement with the U.S. And even if it does, technology from the demonstrator might be useful to the U.S.

Japanese participation in the next U.S. fighter program is now conceivable because Tokyo has relaxed its arms-export restrictions, which in the past have largely prevented its industry from working with foreign partners. The way is not entirely open for cooperation, however, since Japan might be reluctant to supply some countries that the U.S. sees as suitable customers.

Stealth technology is also a feature of the F-3 program, as it has been for the i3 Fighter. That, too, is probably a hedge against failure to cooperate with the U.S., which is unlikely to need much Japanese help in that area when it designs its next fighter.


Other work flagged for the i3 Fighter might be enticingly dangled under the Pentagon's nose, though. The Technical Research and Development Institute and industry are working on skin sensors, directed-energy weapons and advanced avionics.

Arguing that neighboring countries—meaning China, South Korea and Russia—will have stealth fighters and longer-range missiles in the 2020s, the ministry is asking for ¥1.6 billion in fiscal 2013-16 to study integration of antennas into the skin of an aircraft, thereby helping to control radar reflections. The antennas would be those for electronic support measures, which listen to enemy transmissions, and electronic countermeasures (ECM), which jam and confuse them.

The ministry also wants to push ahead Japanese ECM technology, to preserve national independence in that area that was developed in building a system for the F-15. The ECM work must be part of what the ministry calls an “all-around surveillance and jamming system.” Japan is also looking for “reflection suppression” technology, apparently distinct from stealth shaping and materials. Details are unavailable. Results of this electro-magnetic work are to be assessed in 2019.

From fiscal 2010 the institute ran a ¥2.5 billion study on “internal weapons aerodynamics,” apparently an investigation into releasing bombs and missiles from bays, and now it wants ¥3.8 billion for further work, including a test rig.



Rumors on a Gaza Cease-Fire

Special Report by Stratfor


Contradictory rumors regarding the outcome of cease-fire negotiations between Hamas and Israel have increased dramatically in recent hours. A Hamas spokesman told Al Jazeera that Israel and Hamas have agreed to 90 percent of the terms of a new cease-fire. Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi is reportedly meeting the evening of Nov. 18 with a delegation led by Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and another delegation led by Palestinian Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ramadan Abdullah Shallah. While Israeli officials have told news outlets that the government is in talks with Cairo on a cease-fire, Israeli officials are now denying reports that an Israeli envoy actually traveled to Cairo Nov. 18 for cease-fire talks. Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be trying to integrate itself into the cease-fire talks with reported plans for Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to travel to Gaza on Nov. 20.

There are many good reasons for cease-fire negotiations to be taking place right now. First, Hamas wants to achieve a symbolic victory through its long-range rocket attacks against Tel Aviv and Jerusalem but does not necessarily want to pay the price of seeing its leadership and infrastructure devastated in an Israeli ground invasion. Second, Israel has a political imperative to neutralize Hamas' long-range rocket threat but does not want to necessarily go through with a ground invasion that could draw Israeli forces into urban warfare in seeking out weapons storage and assembly facilities. Lastly, Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood can gain politically from publicly demonstrating solidarity with the Palestinians but also does not want to deal with the political repercussions of an Israeli ground attack in Gaza and the pressure that would follow from both Israel and the United States in trying to force Egypt to crack down on its border crossings with Gaza.
Though talks are certainly taking place, it does not appear that a cease-fire agreement is imminent. Even if 90 percent of the terms are agreed upon, as is being claimed, it is the final 10 percent that could matter most. There is little middle ground in this negotiation at this stage so long as Hamas is insistent on retaining its Fajr-5 long-range rocket capability and so long as Israel views a ground operation as necessary to neutralize that threat. Egypt is central to this negotiation; while secondary players like Qatar and Turkey are trying to edge their way into this negotiation, they do not have meaningful leverage to sway either side. Reports indicate that Hamas is pushing for a temporary truce in return for Egypt opening the border blockade on Gaza and Israel halting targeted killings of its leaders and military commanders. However, unless Egypt is willing and able to assume responsibility for Hamas' rocket arsenal for a long-term truce to satisfy Israel's security concerns, it will be difficult for Israel to move forward in these talks.

Though there have been claims that rocket fire out of Gaza has slowed down (thus indicating progress toward a cease-fire), a closer look at the data since the beginning of the crisis shows that the timing and rate of rocket volleys into Israel through Nov. 18 remains fairly consistent. Militants in Gaza have typically stopped their rocket fire around 7 p.m., after sunset, to reinitiate it around 7 a.m. the next day. One of the reasons for this may be the vulnerability of operators to detection by Israeli intelligence, surveillance and reconissance assets and resulting airstrikes. The time at which rocket fired slowed down on Nov. 18 was no different from the days before it, and the volume of attacks has been consistent with that of previous days as well.

Additionally, we have also seen two Fajr strikes on Tel Aviv on Nov. 18, the latest of which took place after sunset right before rocket fire slowed down for the night. Likewise, after gradually decreasing Nov. 17, the rate of Israeli air strikes on Gaza is beginning to climb again, keeping in line with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Nov. 18 announcement to his Cabinet that targeted killings would increase. There remains a possibility that we could see a spike in attacks by both sides as both Israel and Hamas try to strengthen their negotiating positions and accomplish as much as they can through their respective attacks before a cease-fire deal is actually struck. Watching Egypt's actions in the coming hours will reveal just how close or far both sides may be to a deal.

A Pause for Negotiations in the Israeli-Hamas Conflict


By George Friedman



MENAHEM KAHANA/AFP/Getty Images
Israeli soldiers prepare for a ground operation in the Gaza Strip on Nov. 18


The Israeli-Hamas conflict has entered into a negotiation phase. Both sides want talks. Hamas wants them because any outcome that prevents an Israeli ground assault gives it the opportunity to retain some of its arsenal of Fajr-5 rockets; the Israelis want them because the cost of an invasion could be high, and they recall the political fallout of Operation Cast Lead in 2008, which alienated many European and other governments.

No matter how much either side might want to avoid ground warfare, negotiations are unlikely to forestall an Israeli assault because Hamas' and Israel's goals leave little middle ground.


One of Hamas' main goals in this current round of fighting is to retain enough Fajr-5 rockets to allow it to threaten the Israeli heartland, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor. If they succeed, Hamas will have gained a significant lever in its relations with the Israelis. The Israeli goal is to deny Hamas these rockets. The problem for the Israelis is that this requires a ground assault in order to have any chance of success. The Israelis may think they know where the rockets are, but they cannot be certain. Airstrikes can target known facilities, at least those where rockets are not stored in hardened underground bunkers. But only by going in on the ground with substantial force will the Israelis have the opportunity to search for and destroy the rockets.
Finding middle ground will be difficult. The retention of the Fajr-5 both dramatically improves Hamas' strategic position and gives Hamas the chance to further weaken the Palestinian National Authority. Hamas cannot agree to any deal that takes the rockets away -- or that does not at least leave open the possibility that it could have them. Meanwhile, Israel simply cannot live with the Fajr-5 in the hands of Hamas.

Lack of International Involvement

It is interesting to note the remarkable indifference of most countries that normally rush to mediate such disputes, the United States chief among them. Washington has essentially endorsed the Israeli position so strongly that it has no option to mediate. The Turks, who had been involved with the Gaza issue during the flotilla incident of May 2010, have taken no steps beyond rhetoric in spite of relations with both Hamas and Israel. The Saudis have also avoided getting involved.

The Egyptians have been the most active in trying to secure a cease fire: Beyond sending their prime minister into Gaza on Nov. 16, as well as their intelligence chief and a group of security officials, Cairo then hosted a delegation of senior Hamas and Islamic Jihad members to further this goal. But while the Egyptians have a great interest in preventing an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza and are crucial to the Israeli imperative to prevent weapons smuggling via Gaza, there is little more they can do at present to mediate between the two sides.

If no one seems to want to serve as mediator, it is because there is such little room for negotiation. It is not ideology but strategy that locks each side into place. Hamas has come this far and does not want to give up what it has maneuvered for. Israel cannot allow Hamas a weapon that threatens the Israeli heartland. This situation is too serious for the parties to reach an agreement that ends the hostilities for now but in reality simply pushes back the issues to be addressed later. No one is eager to mediate a failure. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has said he will go to Gaza in the coming week, but he will not be in a position to find middle ground.

Israel will not budge on this. Hamas could be compelled to relent under threat from its core financial supporters in the Arabian Peninsula, but these states, such as Qatar, are all far more concerned with the threat posed by Iran. The fact that these rockets likely originated with Iran ought to give them incentive to lean on Hamas.

Dubious Prospects for Negotiations

It is important to bear in mind that the war is already under way. Israeli airstrikes are intense and continuous. Hamas is firing rockets at Israel. What has not yet happened is a direct ground attack on Gaza by the Israelis, although they have been mobilizing forces and should now be in a position to attack if they so choose. But the Israelis would much rather not attack. They fear the consequences -- measured both in human casualties and in political fallout -- that would certainly follow.

Thus, both sides want a negotiated end on terms that would leave the other side in an impossible position. While Hamas might be able to live with the status quo, Israel cannot. A negotiated end is therefore unlikely. Still, both sides are signaling their willingness to talk, and however forlorn the possibilities, there is a chance that something could be arranged.

We remain of the opinion that this current pause will be followed by a ground assault. Only by expanding the discussion beyond the Fajr-5 to a broader settlement of Hamas-Israeli issues could these negotiations succeed, but that would require Hamas recognizing Israel's right to exist and Israel accepting the equivalent of a Palestinian state run by Hamas in Gaza -- one that might spread its power to the West Bank. The more expansive the terms of these negotiations get, the more dubious their prospects for success -- and these negotiations start off fairly dubious as it is.