A maintenance scandal has led Israel to conclude, after more than 40 years, that its remaining Skyhawk advanced trainers need replacement. McDonnell Douglas’ A-4 Skyhawk, aka. “Scooter,” is best known for its long and storied career as a carrier-based attack aircraft with the US Navy; Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] was flying one when he was shot down over North Vietnam. It also had a storied land-based career with the Israeli Air Force. Beginning in late 1967, the IAF used this simple, pilot-friendly aircraft as a versatile attack aircraft with surprising air-air teeth.
Israel’s induction of F-16s was a turning point for the Skyhawk, which declined in importance, but never vanished entirely from service. Some are in storage or used as specialty platforms, others have been sold or leased to private operators, and the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF Lead-In Fighter Training. So, what’s next? A $1 billion advanced trainer competition – and a major geo-political decision.
On Wings of Skyhawks: Service in Israel
IAF A-4N – note
extended tailpipe
extended tailpipe
The Skyhawk is a much-beloved jet in the Israeli Air Force. The little A-4’s surprising maneuverability was coupled with an equally surprising ability to take battle damage, making it a popular and reliable choice over several wars. The type was last used heavily in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli fleet took correspondingly heavy loses: of 102 aircraft lost, 53 were Skyhawks.
That war was not without its moments of distinction. In one engagement, an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk found itself facing 3 MiG-21s. The maneuverable little Skyhawk turned on them and brought 2 of them down, and was reportedly on the 3rd Fishbed’s tail when an IAF Mirage IIIC zipped through and blasted the MiG out of the sky. Per mission losses in 1973 were just 0.6%, a lower figure than the previous 1970 War of Attrition with Egypt.
Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall. When Israel began inducting F-16s, the A-4s began to take a back seat. Some did participate in the 1982 Lebanon War, and one even scored a MiG-17 kill. By that time, however, squadron migrations to the F-16 had already begun, and 33 of the Skyhawks had been sold to Indonesia. By the mid 1990s, almost all of Israel’s fighter squadrons had migrated, and 2000-2001 saw a handful of Israeli Skyhawks sold to corporate operators like BAE and ATSI.
A number of Israeli A-4E/H/N aircraft are currently stored at Ovda Air Base, some planes have been used as electronic warfare support aircraft, others have been sold or leased tocontractors like ATAC, and as noted earlier, the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF pilot training.
Flying Israeli Skyhawks required maintenance, which was being provided by the contractor Kanfei Tahzuka, via Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Unfortunately, the little plane that could appears to have finally met its match. A combination of time’s wear and questionable maintenance performance grounded Israel’s Skyhawk fleet – and are about to lead to a replacement buy.
IAF Replacement Candidates
IAF F-16B
Candidates to replace the aircraft reportedly included converted IAF early-model F-16Bs, Boeing’s license-produced T-45TS Goshawk used by the US Navy, Finmeccanica’s M346 variant of the Yak-130, andKorea’s supersonic T-50.
The F-16s were reportedly a low-ranking option, because of the difficulty of transitioning from a primary jet trainer like the Fouga Magister or its T-6A turboprop replacement. They did not make the shortlist.
The T-45 Goshawk would have offered a welcome boost for Boeing’s closing production line, and could have been purchased with American military aid dollars. The flip side is that the US Navy hasn’t invested in giving them secondary mission capabilities beyond their training role. This option didn’t make the shortlist, either.
T-45 Goshawks
Militarily, the chosen M346’s performance profile, and ordnance-carrying capability in a pinch, are probably the closest to the Skyhawk’s. Unlike its Russian Yak-130 counterpart, however, the M346 hasn’t been built and tested in a light attack version. Depending on how the Israelis chose to look at things, that could be seen as a disadvantage, or as a perceived opportunity. Beyond the military sphere, Finmeccanica has had to overcome doubts regarding Italy’s long-term political stability as a supplier, and its long-term economic stability as a customer. The latter is especially relevant, as future Italian purchases of Israeli equipment were the key to winning the deal. The Israelis believe that they have negotiated appropriate safeguards for that risk.
South Korea’s supersonic T-50 family offers the best aerodynamic performance of the 2 planes, and existing weapons integration gives it the ability to operate as an “F-16 Lite” beyond its training role. Israeli firms have made inroads into the Korean market with their UAVs and radars, and a wide variety of further orders beckon. A TA-50 order could have represented the next step for both countries, including Israeli cooperation toward a TA-50 with even broader light attack capabilities. Even without that, a T-50 buy would create the most capable military option for the IAF, while solving a problem for South Korea. An improved TA-50 trainer & light fighter would have the potential for significant ripple effects in the global arms market, and align Israel with their close supplier Lockheed Martin. That high potential upside would have come with a corresponding cost, however, as this would be Israel’s most expensive option.
A Geo-Political Decision
IAF Mirage IIIC:
A cautionary tale?
A cautionary tale?
Israel’s finalist list narrowed its jet trainer options, but expanded the political considerations involved in the deal. In the end, those political and economic considerations may dominate the decision.
On the one hand, there’s South Korea. Israeli firms are cooperating with South Korea on a wide range of defense projects, from mini-UAVs to ballistic missile defense radars. The ROK is quietly emerging as a significant military export market for Israeli firms, and that cooperation has the potential to grow further, via South Korean interest in Iron Dome rocket interceptors and other products. Israel needs military exports to keep its military industries strong, and help lower prices for Israeli equipment. That means acquiring at least one new client per decade who looks… well, a lot like South Korea.
The T-50 Golden Eagle is an important national project for the Koreans. Their initial export sale to Indonesia took some of the pressure off, but they’re still very keen on exporting their jet to gain credibility abroad, and want to pick up momentum in America ahead of the USAF’s possible T-X decision. An Israeli “yes” would add credibility to their American ambitions, and would also help in places like Europe (vid. Poland). Israel is known as a careful buyer who insists on quality, and Israeli jets with offensive capabilities have good odds of gaining the coveted “combat proven” label. That, too, has value in the global market, especially when one of your jet’s key selling points is its high-end capabilities.
As the ROK ambassador has said, this relationship would survive an Israeli “no”. The arms it buys from Israel are needed, and there’s an unexpected cultural connection in South Koreathrough the Jewish Talmud, of all things. The question is whether the relationship would remain as strong. Or, whether other relationships might grow to supplant it. Turkey is currently South Korea’s biggest arms export customer, for instance, and its Ottomanist Islamic government is hostile to Israel. Indonesia became the first export buyer for the T-50, and followed that purchase by buying Daewoo-built U209 submarines. The United Arab Emirate is still seen as a possible destination for the T-50. Etc. If the bilateral relationship with Israel doesn’t keep growing, and defense relationships with countries hostile to Israel do keep growing, that’s likely to begin affecting South Korean foreign policies, as well as its defense ties.
Even if Israel does buy Korean, their experiences with France in the 1960s taught them that the risk of partner flips needs to be taken seriously. France went from Israel’s top weapon supplier to an arms embargo, as the country decided to seek favor and contracts with hostile Arab regimes instead. Lockheed Martin’s role as a co-bidder means that Israel needn’t worry about a T-50 embargo, as was the case with their Mirages – but Israel could conclude that a T-50 buy wouldn’t really change their future with South Korea.
Hydrocarbon rights
On the other hand, there’s Italy. Under former Prime Minister Berlusconi, relations were friendly, and Italy has been a supportive ally. Israel needs those in Europe, which is not a great future defense market, but is their main market for general economic exports. Europe becomes even more important following Israel’s discovery of huge gas fields off its Mediterranean coast. That gas must be exported, and Europe would be the destination. Currently, Russia and Turkey are key supply chokepoints for pipelines supplying Europe, though Italy’s pipeline to Algeria and Libya has some offsetting value. A pipeline through Turkey doesn’t make much sense for Israel, and even its plans to cooperate with Cyprus/Greece still leave Italy and Germany as next-step distribution hubs.
Berlusconi has stepped down, but even out of office, he will retain significant influence through Italy’s media. Israel will want long-term relations with Berlusconi, and Italy, to remain good. That could become tricky, given the European Left’s growing hostility toward Israel and Jews, but it’s not impossible. Berlusconi’s exit also helps somewhat, because it weakens the case for, and expectation of, a reward for long-standing ties.
On the other hand, Italy has reportedly taken steps to expand the potential deal, to include more wide-ranging trade and defense ties. A reported swap of M-346 trainers for Israeli AWACS jets is one way to strengthen those long-term ties, by making Israel both a high-profile export client, and the supplier of strategically important military hardware. The agreement also reportedly included joint development of satellite projects, and the sale of Israeli UAVs.
If reports in Ha’aretz are true, Israeli MoD Director-General Udi Shani inked a preliminary deal with his Italian counterpart in May 2011. Preliminary deals are subject to review, of course, and much has changed in the interim. On the other hand, the Israelis did announce the M-346 as their choice in February 2012. Which happened after consultations, bids, and deadlines to improve offsetting industrial packages, but without ever issuing a formal RFP.
Before the decision, DID wrote that:
“If Israel decides that their South Korean relationship is worth fighting for, the question may come down to whether or not they can find a way to keep the Italians close, and retain Berlusconi as a friend, while keeping the Koreans closer. If not, a hard choice lies ahead.”
Israel has taken a step toward that hard choice. For all anyone outside the process knows, the decision may have been made on straight economics, based on the countries’ respective industrial commitments. There are early indications, however, that the decision is not being seen that way in South Korea. What happens next will bear close scrutiny, extending far beyond the confines of a single jet deal.
Note: article from www.defenseindustrydaily.com
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